Table of Contents
Setting the Stage: The Levant Before Mass Politics
Arab nationalism in the Levant emerged in a world that was changing rapidly, but it did not start from nothing. The Levant, in the context of this chapter, mainly refers to the Arabic-speaking provinces of the late Ottoman Empire that later became Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. For centuries these areas had been part of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious empire in which most educated elites thought of themselves primarily as Ottoman subjects and, secondarily, in religious or local terms: Muslim, Christian, Druze; Damascene, Beiruti, Jerusalemite.
In the nineteenth century, however, several developments unsettled these older identities. The Ottoman Empire launched reforms known as the Tanzimat, seeking to centralize authority, introduce modern bureaucracies, and create a new sense of common “Ottoman citizenship” across religions. At the same time, European powers expanded their influence through trade, missionary schools, consular protection, and occasional military pressure. These changes brought new ideas about nation, language, and popular sovereignty into Arab provinces.
Arab nationalism in the Levant grew out of this mixture: the desire to reform and preserve the Ottoman order, the frustration with centralization and inequality within the empire, and the attraction of new ideas about collective identity based on shared language and culture rather than solely on religion or dynastic loyalty.
Early Cultural Awakening and the Arabic Language
Before Arab nationalism became an explicitly political program, it first appeared as a cultural movement. In the nineteenth century, the Levant experienced what is often called the Nahda, or “Arab renaissance.” Intellectuals and writers, many of them Christians from cities like Beirut and Aleppo, began to modernize the Arabic language, revive interest in classical Arabic literature, and produce new newspapers, novels, and scientific works.
Language was central. Arabic had long been the language of religion and learning, but in many everyday settings, regional dialects and other languages were common. Reformers treated the Arabic language as a shared heritage of all Arabic-speaking peoples, regardless of religion. Journals, printing presses, and literary societies spread the idea that there was a broader Arab society tied together by a common tongue. In this way, cultural Arabism preceded and prepared the ground for more overtly political forms of Arab nationalism.
Mission schools and modern secular schools, some founded by European missionaries and others by local associations, also played a role. They taught new curricula, included European languages and ideas, and often presented Arab history and literature as distinct fields of pride. Educated youth in the Levant encountered concepts like “nation,” “people,” and “rights,” and some began to ask whether Arabs, understood as Arabic-speaking communities, could be considered such a nation.
From Ottoman Patriotism to Arab Particularism
For much of the nineteenth century, many Arab intellectuals in the Levant saw no contradiction between being “Arab” and “Ottoman.” They called for reform within the empire, equal rights for all subjects, and a greater role for Arabic language and culture in education and administration. What they criticized was not necessarily Ottoman rule itself, but misrule, corruption, or unequal treatment.
This loyalty was strained by the empire’s attempts to centralize power. Ottoman authorities in Istanbul, especially under Sultan Abdülhamid II and later the Young Turk movement, promoted a stronger sense of Turkish and Islamic character at the center. Many Arab elites in the Levant perceived this as marginalizing Arab language and local autonomy. Arab officers and bureaucrats stationed in the provinces or in the imperial capital began meeting in secret societies that blended Ottoman reformism with a growing sense of Arab particularism.
The line between reformist Ottomanism and Arab nationalism was not always clear. Some activists spoke the language of “decentralization,” asking for local control over education, taxation, and administration within a still-unified empire. Others began to imagine a more distinct political future for the Arabs, either as an autonomous region within a reformed empire or, more radically, as an independent Arab state or federation.
Secret Societies and Early Political Organizing
In the decades before the First World War, Arab nationalism in the Levant moved from salons and newspapers into more organized political networks. Secret societies, often composed of educated Arab officers and civil servants, emerged in cities such as Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo. These groups reflected both the new political atmosphere of the Ottoman Empire and the particular grievances of Arab elites.
One influential network was the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralization, formed in Cairo by Syrian and Lebanese exiles and intellectuals. It argued that Arab provinces should manage their own affairs under the broad umbrella of the empire, emphasizing that Arabic should be the language of administration in Arab-majority regions. In the Levant itself, clubs and associations, some literary on the surface, served as meeting points for people who quietly discussed Arab rights and future political arrangements.
These societies did not all share the same goals. Some members wanted modest reforms; others, especially younger officers influenced by broader nationalist currents in Europe and the Balkans, saw the Arabs as a separate nation whose destiny might lie outside Ottoman rule. This diversity of aims would later shape different paths taken by leaders in Damascus, Beirut, and other Levantine centers.
The Young Turk Era and Rising Tensions
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which restored the Ottoman constitution and parliament, initially raised hopes among Arab reformers in the Levant. Many welcomed the promise of representation and legal equality. Arab deputies from Syrian and Lebanese districts were elected to parliament, and for a time it seemed that Ottoman constitutionalism could accommodate Arab aspirations.
However, tensions soon grew between centralizing factions in the Young Turk leadership and Arab politicians who wanted greater autonomy. Many Arab deputies complained that the ruling Committee of Union and Progress promoted Turkish language and identity at the expense of others. Demands for administrative decentralization and recognition of Arabic in education and government were often rejected.
In this atmosphere, Arab nationalist sentiment hardened. Publicly, most leaders still spoke the language of loyalty to the empire, partly because open separatism could invite repression. Privately, however, more discussions focused on Arab self-determination. New publications in Damascus and Beirut elaborated the idea of an “Arab nation” stretching across Arabic-speaking lands, with the Levant at its cultural heart.
Repression further radicalized some activists. During the First World War, the Ottoman authorities under Jamal Pasha, the military governor of Greater Syria, cracked down on suspected Arab nationalists, executing several in Damascus and Beirut in 1915 and 1916. These executions, remembered in the Levant as a national trauma, gave Arab nationalism powerful martyrs and hardened public anger against Ottoman rule.
The Arab Revolt and Sharifian Leadership
Against this backdrop of wartime hardship and repression, events elsewhere in the Arab world influenced the course of nationalism in the Levant. The Hashemite Sharif Hussein of Mecca, encouraged by British promises, launched the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule in 1916. His sons, particularly Faisal, became important figures not only in the Hijaz but also in Arab politics in the Levant.
Some Levantine Arab nationalists saw in the Hashemite family a potential unifying leadership for the Arab cause. The idea emerged of a large Arab kingdom, possibly stretching from the Arabian Peninsula through the Levant and Mesopotamia. For activists in cities like Damascus, however, this vision competed with more localized aspirations. They wanted the Levant to have a strong voice, not merely to be a peripheral region in a larger Arab monarchy based in the Hijaz.
During and immediately after the war, Faisal cultivated ties with Levantine elites. Arab officers from the region joined his forces, and political clubs in Damascus began to speak more openly of Arab self-rule. In these circles, Arab nationalism was not a vague sentiment; it was translated into concrete projects for constitutions, parliaments, and administrative systems for a future Arab state centered in Syria and its neighboring territories.
Postwar Dreams: Greater Syria and the Levant
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War, Arab nationalists in the Levant faced both an opportunity and a profound challenge. For a brief moment, they could act more freely, holding congresses and drafting political programs. Many of them envisioned “Greater Syria,” a political entity that would include present-day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and sometimes Jordan, united under Arab leadership and distinct from both Ottoman and European rule.
In Damascus, Faisal established a short-lived Arab government with participation from local notables, army officers, and intellectuals from across the Levant. They debated whether their primary identity was Syrian (in a broad, regional sense) or Arab (in a wider, language-based sense) and how to balance these overlapping loyalties. Many saw no contradiction: Syria was simply one part of a larger Arab nation and would play a leading role in its formation.
In these discussions, Palestine appeared as one of the provinces of this Greater Syrian framework. The idea of carving out separate political units along the exact future borders of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan was not yet dominant among Arab nationalists in the region. Rather, they emphasized shared history, economic ties, and cultural unity across the Levantine coastal cities, inland towns, and rural hinterlands.
Colonial Carve-Up and Fragmented Nationalisms
The postwar settlement fundamentally altered the trajectory of Arab nationalism in the Levant. Instead of recognizing a single Arab state in Greater Syria, the victorious European powers imposed a system of mandates. France took control over Syria and Lebanon; Britain took control over Palestine and the territory that would become Jordan. These mandates divided the Levant into separate political and administrative units under European oversight.
For Arab nationalists in the Levant, this division had two major consequences. First, it turned their broad vision of a unified Syrian or Arab state into a project of resistance against multiple colonial powers. Nationalism had to adapt to new political borders and legal frameworks, as activists in Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Amman faced different administrative systems and colonial strategies.
Second, it pushed Arab politics in the Levant toward a tension between “pan-Arab” and “local” nationalisms. Some activists continued to call for the unity of all Arab lands, or at least the reunification of Greater Syria, emphasizing shared language and culture across colonial borders. Others focused more on building distinct national identities within the new mandates (Syrian, Lebanese, Palestinian, and Transjordanian) while still seeing themselves as part of an Arab world. This tension would shape how the Arab national movement interacted with emerging Palestinian politics and the conflict over the future of Palestine.
Arab Nationalism and the Question of Palestine
Within this divided Levant, the question of Palestine took on a special significance for Arab nationalists. They now confronted not only European colonial rule but also the growing Zionist project, which aimed at establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. For Arab nationalists in the Levant, this was not merely a local dispute but a challenge to Arab claims over a central part of their imagined homeland.
Levantine Arab nationalists framed Palestine as an integral part of the Arab East. The population was seen as part of the broader Arab nation, and the land itself held religious and cultural value for Muslims and Christians alike. Opposition to Zionist immigration and land acquisition in Palestine thus became intertwined with broader Arab nationalist discourse. When protests and political mobilization emerged in Palestine, they were quickly echoed and supported in neighboring Arab capitals.
At the same time, the existence of distinct administrative boundaries and differing colonial regimes meant that Palestinian activism had its own particular trajectory, even as it remained linked to broader Arab currents. Arab nationalism in the Levant, therefore, both embraced Palestine as a cause and struggled with the practical challenge of coordinating action across the new borders imposed by the mandates.
Diversity Within the Arab National Movement
Arab nationalism in the Levant was never a single, unified ideology. It encompassed a range of political visions and social bases. Some of its leaders were traditional urban notables who sought to protect their privileges under new circumstances and saw nationalism as a tool to negotiate with or resist foreign powers. Others were younger officers, teachers, and students attracted to more radical ideas, including secularism, socialism, or republicanism.
Religious diversity added another layer. Christians played a prominent role in the early cultural phase of Arab nationalism, particularly in journalism and education, while many Muslim scholars and activists adapted Islamic concepts to nationalist language. Some argued that Arab nationalism and Islam were complementary, seeing the Arabs as the original carriers of Islam and therefore naturally suited to leadership in the Muslim world. Others emphasized a more secular, language-based nationalism that could equally include Muslims and Christians.
These differences did not prevent cooperation, but they did shape debates over what kind of political order an Arab Levant should have. Questions of monarchy versus republic, centralization versus federalism, and the role of religion in the state divided nationalists and influenced the forms that later political movements, including those focused specifically on Palestine, would take.
Legacy for Later Palestinian and Regional Politics
The development of Arab nationalism in the Levant created an ideological and political environment in which the Palestinian question would later unfold. The idea that Arabs, defined by their shared language and culture, formed a nation deserving of self-determination provided a framework within which Palestinians could present their own claims. The concept of Greater Syria and the experience of resisting foreign rule under the mandates forged networks and narratives that Palestinians would draw on.
At the same time, the fragmentation of the Levant into separate states introduced enduring tensions. Palestinian activists often appealed to broader Arab solidarity, expecting support from Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian nationalists. But each of these communities also had its own state-building projects, interests, and constraints. The Arab nationalism that had once imagined a unified Levant was now operating in a landscape of multiple, sometimes competing, national agendas.
These early patterns, broad pan-Arab ideals, local nationalisms, colonial borders, and the centrality of Palestine within regional politics, set the stage for later developments. As the conflict over the future of Palestine intensified in the twentieth century, Arab nationalism in the Levant would shape and be reshaped by that struggle, influencing how different societies in the region understood their own identities and political priorities.