Palestinian Political Movements

Overview of Palestinian Political Movements After 1967

Palestinian political movements in the occupation era developed within a landscape shaped by military rule, displacement, and the absence of a sovereign state. After 1967, politics increasingly took place in three interconnected arenas. These were the occupied territories themselves, the refugee camps and wider diaspora, and the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Each space produced distinct organizations and strategies, yet all were linked by shared questions about representation, resistance, and what the future political framework should be.

In this period, Palestinian politics revolved around a core set of dilemmas. Who legitimately speaks for the Palestinian people. Is the goal full liberation of all of historic Palestine or a state alongside Israel. Is armed struggle essential, or should the priority be popular protest and diplomacy. Different movements answered these questions in different ways, which led to cooperation, rivalry, and at times violent internal clashes.

The PLO as a Framework and Its Transformations

The Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, was founded before 1967, but the occupation turned it into the main formal address for Palestinian politics. In the years after the war, the PLO became an umbrella that hosted multiple factions. Some factions were secular and nationalist, others leaned left, and later, various Islamist currents developed mostly outside the PLO structure.

The largest faction within the PLO was Fatah, which grew rapidly after 1967. Under its leadership, the PLO came to claim that it represented all Palestinians, whether they lived in the West Bank and Gaza, in refugee camps in neighboring Arab states, or in more distant diaspora communities. This claim to represent all Palestinians, not just those under occupation, would later create tensions when new movements arose that focused primarily on the situation inside the territories.

Over time, the PLO’s strategy shifted from a strong emphasis on armed struggle and rejection of Israel toward acceptance of diplomatic engagement and a two state framework. This evolution changed the internal balance of Palestinian politics. Movements that saw compromise as betrayal gained new rivals who defined themselves against the PLO’s path and presented themselves as the true guardians of uncompromising resistance.

Secular and Leftist Currents Under Occupation

Within the PLO, a group of left wing factions articulated a vision that linked Palestinian national liberation to broader social and economic transformations. In the context of occupation, they built support through student unions, trade unions, and professional associations, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP, became known for its Marxist reading of the conflict and for spectacular acts of violence outside the immediate arena of the occupation, such as plane hijackings. Under occupation, it tried to organize a more structured popular base at the local level and to connect Palestinian struggle to global anti colonial movements. It often criticized Fatah for what it saw as political pragmatism or excessive readiness to compromise.

Other left leaning groups, such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, DFLP, focused more on mass organizing and sometimes signaled earlier openness to political solutions that involved partial territorial compromise. Inside the occupied territories, these organizations helped inspire networks of local committees that would later play a key role in the First Intifada, where the emphasis was on popular, community based resistance.

Over time, the influence of secular leftist factions inside Palestinian society declined. Reasons included repression by Israeli authorities, competition with larger nationalist and Islamist groups, and the global retreat of socialist ideologies. Yet their early role in framing the struggle as both national and social left a legacy in Palestinian civil society organizations and activist culture.

The Emergence of Islamist Movements

Islamist movements became dominant actors in Palestinian politics in the later occupation period. Their roots lay in religious networks and social organizations that predated 1967 but gained new significance under occupation. Initially, many of these networks concentrated on charity, education, and religious life, often with less direct confrontation with Israeli authorities than the secular nationalist factions.

The most important Islamist current was the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, which had been present for decades but was not initially central to armed resistance. Over time, a younger generation within these circles began arguing that national liberation and Islamic revival could not be separated. This shift laid the groundwork for the creation of new movements that explicitly combined religious ideology with armed and political struggle.

Islamist groups differed from secular factions not only in religious outlook, but also in how they imagined Palestinian society after liberation. They tended to view the struggle as part of a broader conflict over the role of Islam in public life, law, and governance. This outlook attracted some Palestinians who were disillusioned with the perceived corruption or ineffectiveness of secular leadership, especially as the occupation persisted and living conditions worsened.

Hamas and the Reframing of Resistance

Hamas emerged in the late 1980s from the Muslim Brotherhood networks in the occupied territories. It initially built its influence by combining social services, religious activism, and participation in the popular uprising of the First Intifada. From the start, Hamas refused to join the PLO, which it saw as dominated by secular factions and too willing to consider compromise with Israel.

In its founding documents, Hamas presented the conflict in religious and historical terms and rejected the recognition of Israel as legitimate. It emphasized armed struggle, alongside social and religious work, as a religious duty. During the 1990s and 2000s, Hamas became known for suicide bombings and rocket attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets. These tactics, which other Palestinian factions also used at different times, had deep political consequences, including harsh Israeli military responses and international designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization by many states.

Under occupation, Hamas also participated in more conventional politics. It boycotted some early processes, such as parts of the Oslo framework, but decided to contest the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. Its electoral victory reflected a combination of its reputation for social service delivery, its stance against corruption, and support for its harder line on negotiations. This success transformed Hamas from an opposition movement into a governing actor in Gaza and a central player in Palestinian internal politics.

Hamas’s dual character as both an armed movement and a political party has remained a source of controversy and internal debate among Palestinians. Some value its resistance stance as a necessary counterweight to perceived PLO concessions. Others criticize its methods and argue that its actions have brought severe collective suffering and deepened Palestinian political division.

Islamic Jihad and Smaller Armed Groups

Alongside Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad developed as another Islamist movement dedicated to armed resistance. It was smaller in size and less involved in the political and administrative structures created under occupation. Instead, it concentrated more narrowly on military operations and maintained a more rigid rejection of political processes viewed as legitimizing Israel.

Islamic Jihad and smaller armed factions often operated semi autonomously in the occupied territories, carrying out attacks on Israeli targets and building clandestine networks. These organizations sometimes cooperated with larger factions on the ground, and sometimes pursued independent agendas. Their activities contributed to cycles of targeted killings, arrests, and armed clashes that shaped the daily texture of occupation and resistance.

While these groups did not generally claim the right to represent all Palestinians politically, their actions nonetheless influenced the broader field. Their operations affected how Israel perceived Palestinian security structures, how the international community framed Palestinian violence and resistance, and how rival Palestinian movements positioned themselves on the question of armed struggle.

Popular Committees, Unions, and Grassroots Organizing

Not all Palestinian political organizing under occupation took the form of formal parties or armed groups. A crucial dimension of Palestinian political life was rooted in popular committees, student movements, trade unions, professional associations, and women’s organizations. These bodies often cut across factional lines and offered alternative models of leadership and decision making.

During key moments, especially the First Intifada, these grassroots structures coordinated boycotts, strikes, alternative education when schools were closed, and local dispute resolution. They constituted a kind of parallel public sphere, where ordinary Palestinians could express political preferences and practice a form of self organization under occupation.

Although many of these bodies were influenced or controlled by specific factions, they also created space for independent activists who did not fully align with any group. Over time, some of these activists criticized both the PLO leadership and the Islamist movements, calling for more democratic internal practices, better accountability, and new strategies that would emphasize international law, nonviolent resistance, or human rights advocacy.

Palestinian Authority, Governance, and the Party Landscape

The creation of the Palestinian Authority, or PA, in the 1990s introduced a new layer into Palestinian political life under occupation. The PA was meant to be a self governing entity in parts of the West Bank and Gaza, with limited but real administrative and security powers. This structure reshaped the party landscape.

Fatah, as the largest PLO faction, became the dominant force within the PA bureaucracy and security services. Other PLO factions either integrated into this system or remained in the background. For many Palestinians, political life came to be associated with PA institutions, from ministries to local councils, even though ultimate control over borders, movement, and key areas remained in Israeli hands.

This new reality created tensions between the rhetoric of resistance and the practice of day to day governance under occupation. Parties now competed not only over strategic visions, but also over control of budgets, security cooperation, and patronage networks. Accusations of corruption and authoritarianism undermined public trust in some established factions, which in turn contributed to the rise of Islamist and independent challengers.

Hamas’s decision to participate in PA elections and its subsequent takeover of Gaza led to a geographic and institutional split. Gaza and the West Bank came to be ruled by rival Palestinian authorities, each with its own security forces and aligned factions. This split deeply affected the way Palestinian political movements could coordinate strategies of resistance or negotiation, and it complicated the question of who, if anyone, could speak with a single Palestinian voice.

Youth, Independents, and New Forms of Mobilization

In more recent years, younger generations of Palestinians under occupation have often expressed frustration with both the traditional nationalist factions and the Islamist parties. Many perceive the established movements as entrenched, fragmented, and unable to end the occupation or improve daily life. This disillusionment has given rise to new, sometimes loosely organized forms of political activism.

Social media and digital tools have enabled independent campaigns that focus on specific issues such as settlements, political prisoners, or local land struggles. Protest movements have emerged that consciously distance themselves from factional symbols and slogans, highlighting instead themes of dignity, rights, and international solidarity. At times these independent initiatives have clashed with PA security forces or with Hamas authorities in Gaza, showing that the contest over political space is not only between Palestinians and Israelis but also among Palestinians themselves.

Despite their visibility, these newer currents often lack the organizational depth and resources of the older movements. They operate within a constrained environment marked by occupation, internal division, and limited political horizons. Still, they reflect ongoing efforts to rethink what resistance and political participation can look like, beyond the established templates of party politics and formal negotiations.

The Fragmented Map of Representation

Taken together, Palestinian political movements under occupation form a fragmented map. There are older secular factions inside the PLO, Islamist movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, smaller armed groups, grassroots civil society actors, and newer independent networks. Each claims, in different ways, to embody the aspirations or defend the interests of Palestinians.

This fragmentation creates both diversity and difficulty. On the one hand, it allows multiple social groups, ideologies, and generations to find some form of expression. On the other hand, it complicates efforts to build a unified strategy toward the occupation or a coherent negotiating position in international arenas. Questions of legitimacy, elections, and internal reform remain unresolved.

As long as the occupation continues, Palestinian political movements operate in a context where their room to maneuver is constrained by external power and internal rivalry. Their evolution reflects not only ideological debates, but also the pressures of daily life, patterns of repression and cooptation, and shifting regional and global conditions that shape what kinds of politics seem possible or realistic at any given moment.