Internal Divisions

Fragmentation as a Persistent Feature

Internal divisions have been a defining feature of the Palestinian national movement from its early years. These divisions are not simply personality clashes. They reflect different visions of liberation, contrasting strategies for dealing with Israel and the wider world, ideological disputes over religion and secularism, social and class differences, and the geographic separation between Palestinians in the territories, in Israel, and in the diaspora. Understanding these internal rifts helps explain both the dynamism and the chronic weakness of the movement.

Early Rivalries and Family-Based Leadership

In the late Ottoman and early British Mandate periods, Palestinian politics were dominated by a small number of notable families, especially in Jerusalem and other major cities. Rivalries between leading clans, most famously between the al-Husayni and Nashashibi families, shaped political alignments. These families often competed for leadership positions, access to the British authorities, and influence over key institutions such as religious councils and municipal governments.

This form of leadership had two consequences for internal cohesion. First, it personalized political conflicts. Disagreements about how to respond to British policies or Zionist immigration were frequently filtered through family alliances and patronage networks, not just through ideological debate. Second, it left many rural and poorer urban Palestinians feeling distant from decision making, which later made it easier for alternative movements to challenge the old elite.

During moments of crisis, such as the Arab Revolt in the late 1930s, these rivalries could weaken the Palestinian side. While many leaders shared broad goals, they did not always coordinate strategy, and mutual distrust limited the creation of unified institutions. The legacy of this early fragmentation continued to influence Palestinian politics long after the Mandate period ended.

Ideological Splits in the PLO Era

When the Palestine Liberation Organization emerged as the main umbrella of the national movement, it sought to unify diverse factions. Instead, the PLO became a structured arena in which deep ideological differences played out.

Within the PLO, Fatah became the largest and most influential faction. It presented itself as relatively pragmatic and centrist, focusing on Palestinian nationalism rather than a defined leftist or Islamist ideology. Alongside Fatah, several leftist and Marxist groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, argued for broader revolutionary programs. These included visions of transforming the social order within Arab societies and tying the Palestinian struggle to global anti-imperialist movements.

Ideological divisions manifested in debates over armed struggle versus political diplomacy, over relations with Arab regimes, and over the nature of a future state. Some factions insisted on continued armed operations as the primary means of struggle, while others, especially Fatah leadership over time, became more open to negotiations and interim political arrangements. The question of whether to accept a state on part of historic Palestine or insist on the whole territory became a recurring fault line.

These disagreements did not only appear in formal congresses. They shaped who controlled refugee camps, media outlets, and training facilities. They also influenced how different Palestinian communities related to the PLO, since some refugees gravitated to groups that promised radical change, while others preferred the relative stability and patronage offered by larger, more established factions.

Relations with Arab Regimes and “Host Country” Politics

Because so many Palestinians lived outside Palestine, especially in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, the movement had to navigate complex relationships with host states. These relationships became another source of internal division.

Different factions aligned to varying degrees with particular Arab governments. Some groups received funding, arms, or political support from specific regimes, which often expected loyalty in return. When tensions arose between a host government and the PLO, factions more closely tied to that government could oppose the PLO leadership’s decisions or even break away.

The most dramatic example was the conflict in Jordan in 1970 and 1971, often referred to as “Black September.” The PLO’s growing autonomy and military presence in Jordan clashed with the Jordanian monarchy’s concerns about sovereignty and stability. Within Palestinian ranks, not everyone agreed on how far to confront the Jordanian state or how to manage relations with it. The eventual expulsion of PLO forces from Jordan highlighted how vulnerable the movement was to external pressures and how internal disagreements about strategy could have life-altering consequences for refugees and fighters.

Similar dynamics appeared in Lebanon, where the PLO partly filled a power vacuum but also became embroiled in the country’s civil war. Factions differed over how deeply to involve themselves in Lebanese politics, and their varying ties to regional powers sometimes pitted Palestinian groups against each other or created rival chains of command.

Secular–Islamist Tensions and the Rise of Hamas

For decades, the dominant currents in the Palestinian national movement were secular and often left-leaning. However, Islamist activism had been present since the Mandate period and intensified under Egyptian and Israeli rule in Gaza and the West Bank. Over time, an explicitly Islamist national project emerged in the form of Hamas, while Islamic Jihad and smaller groups also appeared.

The rise of Hamas created one of the most significant internal divides. The split was not simply about religion. Hamas combined an Islamic worldview with a different approach to resistance, welfare provision, and political negotiation. It developed its own armed wing, social networks, and charitable infrastructure, often gaining support in areas where people were disillusioned with the perceived corruption or ineffectiveness of existing PLO-linked structures.

Tensions between Hamas and the dominant PLO faction, especially Fatah, revolved around recognition of Israel, participation in the Oslo framework, and the balance between armed struggle and political engagement. While some secular factions accepted negotiated agreements and limited autonomy, Hamas rejected these as dangerous compromises. This fundamentally different assessment of the peace process shaped Palestinian politics from the 1990s onward and deepened after the creation of the Palestinian Authority.

The Fatah–Hamas Split and Territorial Fragmentation

The most visible expression of internal division in the contemporary period is the institutional split between Fatah-led authorities in the West Bank and Hamas-led authorities in Gaza. This split followed legislative elections, power struggles within the Palestinian Authority, and a violent confrontation between the two movements in Gaza in 2007.

The result has been parallel governance structures, separate security forces, and competing claims to legitimacy. Both sides maintain their own bureaucracies, taxation systems, and media outlets. For ordinary Palestinians, this has meant contradictory laws and practices, and sometimes persecution or repression by local authorities based on political affiliation or suspected sympathies.

Territorial fragmentation compounds political division. The geographical separation between Gaza and the West Bank, combined with tight movement restrictions, makes coordination difficult even when leaders reach tentative agreements. Attempts at reconciliation, which have produced a series of accords in name, have repeatedly stalled over issues such as control of security forces, integration of civil servants, and who speaks for Palestinians in negotiations with external actors.

This split has weakened Palestinian bargaining power internationally. Other governments and organizations can choose to engage with one side while sidelining the other. It has also fueled mutual distrust, as each camp accuses the other of prioritizing factional interests over national unity.

Social, Class, and Generational Divides

Internal Palestinian divisions are not only between organizations. They also run along social, class, and generational lines. Urban elites, refugee camp residents, rural communities, business owners, civil servants, and those dependent on aid often experience the conflict and the national movement differently.

For example, segments of the business community and parts of the urban middle class may place a higher priority on economic stability and access to work, even within an imperfect political framework. Others, especially youth in refugee camps or areas most exposed to military operations or settlement expansion, may see continuous confrontation as unavoidable and may be more skeptical of compromise.

Generational divides are particularly visible. Older leaders, many of whom came of age during the heyday of the PLO in the 1960s and 1970s or during the Oslo years, often retain strong attachments to established structures and symbols. Younger activists, who grew up seeing stalled negotiations and entrenched occupation, frequently express frustration with what they view as stagnant leadership. They may gravitate toward new forms of organization, including loosely structured protest movements, digital campaigns, and local initiatives that operate outside traditional factional frameworks.

These social and generational gaps complicate efforts to create a unified strategy. Leaders who attempt to make concessions may fear being portrayed as disconnected from grassroots sentiment, while younger activists may dismiss formal political processes as irrelevant.

The Diaspora and the Question of Representation

Palestinians living outside the West Bank and Gaza form a significant part of the nation, yet their relationship with the institutions that claim to represent them has shifted over time. When the PLO was the central actor in exile, diaspora communities often felt directly tied to its decisions. With the rise of the Palestinian Authority as a territorially based administration, many in the diaspora came to feel marginalized.

This created a new layer of internal division: between those inside the territories, whose daily lives are shaped by the Palestinian Authority’s governance and by direct contact with Israeli policies, and those in the diaspora, whose struggles revolve around citizenship, legal status, and discrimination in host countries. Both groups may share national goals but prioritize different issues. Refugee communities might emphasize the right of return more strongly, while residents of the West Bank and Gaza might focus on immediate questions of movement, land, and local governance.

The question of who legitimately speaks for all Palestinians remains contentious. Some argue that the PLO retains that role formally, even if its structures are weak. Others point to the practical authority of the Palestinian Authority or to the influence of Hamas and other movements. Calls for reforming representative bodies to include broader diaspora participation reflect attempts to address this division, but progress has been slow.

Divisions over Strategy and Vision of the Future

Across all of these layers of division lies a deeper disagreement about long term goals and the best path to achieve them. Some Palestinian actors favor a negotiated two state solution, even if it involves compromises that many consider painful. Others advocate a single state in the whole of historic Palestine, with equal rights for all inhabitants. Still others focus primarily on rights based approaches, emphasizing international law and human rights frameworks without committing to a specific constitutional model.

These divergent visions influence attitudes toward negotiations, international campaigns, and forms of resistance. For example, movements that prioritize international legal strategies may place emphasis on appeals to institutions such as the International Criminal Court. Groups that lean toward continuous resistance, including armed struggle, often emphasize the need to maintain pressure on the ground. Efforts at popular nonviolent mobilization sometimes sit awkwardly between these poles, facing skepticism from both sides.

Because there is no agreed upon end state, even temporary tactical decisions can become sources of bitter dispute. Agreements on security coordination, participation in elections under constrained conditions, or acceptance of partial economic arrangements are all interpreted differently by various factions and social groups. Each step can be framed either as necessary pragmatism or as a betrayal of fundamental principles.

Attempts at Unity and Their Limits

Despite this long history of internal division, efforts to achieve Palestinian unity have been frequent. Factions have signed agreements to form joint committees, interim governments, or unified leadership frameworks. At various points, national dialogue conferences have brought together groups from across the ideological spectrum to discuss common strategies.

These attempts demonstrate a broad recognition that fragmentation weakens the Palestinian position, both internally and internationally. Yet they also reveal the depth of mistrust. Implementation often stalls once the process moves from broad declarations to concrete questions about control over security forces, distribution of resources, and relative political weight.

Unity initiatives also face the reality of external pressures. Regional powers, donor states, and Israel itself have their own preferences about which Palestinian actors they engage. These preferences can encourage or discourage particular forms of unity. In some cases, outside actors have conditioned aid or political recognition on excluding certain factions, which directly affects internal Palestinian calculations.

As a result, internal divisions remain a central feature of the Palestinian national movement. They are constantly reshaped by changing circumstances, but they have not been transcended. Any assessment of Palestinian politics and strategies must take these fractures into account, not as a side note, but as a core element that both constrains and defines the movement’s possibilities.