Table of Contents
Structural Asymmetries and Power Imbalances
A central reason peace efforts have repeatedly failed is that negotiations have taken place under conditions of deep power asymmetry. Israel has had a sovereign state, a unified army, control over territory, borders, and resources, and strong backing from major powers, especially the United States. Palestinians by contrast have lacked a fully sovereign state, have been politically fragmented, and have had limited control over borders, natural resources, and movement.
Because of this imbalance, talks have often been structured around what Israel is willing to concede rather than around the full implementation of previously agreed international principles. For many Palestinians, this has made negotiations feel less like a mutual compromise and more like an attempt to legitimize an unequal status quo. At the same time, many Israelis have viewed their military and diplomatic strength as essential for security and survival, and have been reluctant to accept external pressure that might appear to endanger that security.
This asymmetry has shaped not only the substance of proposals, such as borders, settlements, and security arrangements, but also the procedures of negotiation. Timetables, interim phases, and “confidence building measures” have frequently been designed in ways that allow the stronger party to delay or avoid implementing sensitive commitments with relatively few consequences. Over time this has eroded trust and reinforced the perception that negotiations are a tool for managing the conflict rather than resolving it.
Mismatched Goals and Visions of Peace
Formal peace processes have usually assumed that both sides share a basic vision of a two state solution and differ mainly on details. In reality, core objectives have often been mismatched or only partially overlapping.
For many Palestinian leaders and much of Palestinian society, the central goals include an end to occupation, genuine sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza, a capital in East Jerusalem, removal or major rollback of Israeli settlements, and a just solution for refugees. For many Israeli leaders and a large part of the Israeli public, the emphasis has been on security, maintaining a Jewish majority within the state, and preserving control, in whole or in part, over areas considered strategically or historically important, including parts of the West Bank and a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.
As a result, even when documents or summit statements use similar language, the underlying meanings can be very different. Terms like “Palestinian state,” “refugee solution,” or “Jerusalem question” have been interpreted by each side in ways that leave little overlap. Negotiators have sometimes papered over these gaps with ambiguous wording intended to make agreements possible, but the ambiguity itself has later contributed to breakdowns, since each side expected implementation to follow its own interpretation.
There has also been a gap between public narratives about what peace means and the compromises that any deal would actually require. Political leaders have often been unwilling or unable to prepare their respective societies for the painful trade offs involved. This has made it easy for opponents of agreements to describe proposed compromises as unacceptable betrayals, and has made leaders reluctant to go beyond minimal, reversible commitments.
The Problem of Settlements and Facts Created on the Ground
One of the most persistent structural obstacles has been the ongoing expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem throughout most negotiating periods. As talks have proceeded, the number of settlers and settlement infrastructure have continued to grow.
For Palestinians, settlement growth has seemed to contradict the basic premise of territorial compromise. Land that is supposed to be negotiated for a future Palestinian state is simultaneously being integrated into Israel’s legal, economic, and transportation systems. This has encouraged the view that negotiations are being used as cover for entrenching permanent control. Every new housing unit or bypass road has therefore become a political symbol as well as a practical problem.
For many Israelis, settlements have a range of meanings. Some see them as vital security buffers or as the fulfillment of historical and religious claims. Others may privately believe that some settlements will need to be evacuated in a future agreement but oppose any freeze in the present, arguing that such a step should be part of a final package, not a precondition. This has created internal political constraints on Israeli governments, which often depend on coalition partners who strongly support settlement expansion.
As negotiations have repeatedly stalled, the presence of settlements has made potential territorial divisions more complex and politically painful. Maps proposed in various talks have had to account for settlement “blocs,” access roads, and fragmented Palestinian areas. Over time, this has fed a sense among Palestinians that the territorial basis for a viable state is steadily disappearing, and among Israelis that reversing settlement expansion would be so disruptive that it may be practically impossible.
Refugees, Right of Return, and Historical Injustice
Another core issue that has repeatedly blocked agreements is the question of Palestinian refugees and the “right of return.” For Palestinians, the displacement associated with the Nakba and later wars is not only a humanitarian issue but also a foundational injustice. Many see recognition of responsibility, acknowledgment of suffering, and at least some form of return or serious compensation as essential components of any just peace.
Most Israeli governments, however, have rejected a large-scale return of Palestinian refugees to what is now Israel. They have argued that such a return would endanger the Jewish majority and the character of the state as a national home for the Jewish people. Some Israeli leaders have been willing to discuss limited family reunification, financial compensation, or resettlement in a future Palestinian state, but not the full scale exercise of a right framed as individual and universal.
Negotiators have sometimes tried to bridge this gap with formulations that reference both collective rights and practical limits, such as phased returns, quotas, or symbolic recognition combined with resettlement options. Yet these compromises have often failed to satisfy either side. Palestinians may see them as abandoning a central collective right, while Israelis may fear that even partial acknowledgment creates legal and political pressures that could expand over time.
Because the refugee question reaches deeply into identity and historical memory, it has often been more emotionally charged than technical matters like water or border crossings. Efforts to postpone it to later stages or address it primarily through technical committees have not resolved the underlying clash of narratives and expectations, and have sometimes made later stages of negotiations even harder.
Security, Violence, and Lack of Mutual Trust
Violence surrounding the conflict has repeatedly undermined negotiations. Periods of talks have coincided with suicide bombings, shootings, rocket fire, targeted killings, and large scale military operations. Each side has tended to see the violence of the other as evidence of bad faith, while viewing its own actions as defensive or forced upon it.
For many Israelis, attacks on civilians during negotiation periods have reinforced the belief that Palestinian leaders are either unable or unwilling to control militant groups, and that territorial concessions would create new threats rather than reduce them. This has strengthened arguments for strict security arrangements, including long term military presence in key areas and control over borders and airspace. For many Palestinians, continued military raids, arrests, assassinations, and restrictions during negotiation periods have reinforced the sense that talks do not seriously limit occupation or improve daily life.
Security arrangements have often been central in proposals, including demilitarization of a future Palestinian state, early warning stations, international forces, and phased withdrawals linked to performance benchmarks. However, disagreement over who defines “performance,” and over how quickly restrictions are lifted, has been intense. Palestinians have often seen security conditions as moving targets that can always be used to delay political steps. Israelis have often feared that once territorial control is handed over, it cannot easily be reversed if commitments on security are not met.
Mutual distrust has therefore formed a feedback loop with violence. Each breakdown and each round of bloodshed has made future promises harder to believe and has increased public skepticism about the value of negotiations themselves.
Internal Politics and Leadership Constraints
Peace efforts have also failed because negotiators on each side have been constrained by internal politics. Leaders have had to manage rival factions, party coalitions, and challenges to their own legitimacy, at the same time that they attempted to make far reaching commitments.
On the Palestinian side, fragmentation between different political groups, and later between the authorities in the West Bank and Gaza, has made it difficult to present a single, authoritative position. Agreements signed by one leadership have sometimes been contested by others, who may reject the terms or the process itself. This has allowed critics to argue that any leader who signs a compromise cannot deliver its implementation across all Palestinian constituencies.
On the Israeli side, coalition governments have often depended on parties that are strongly opposed to core elements of potential agreements, such as division of Jerusalem or removal of significant settlements. Leaders seeking to advance far reaching proposals have had to weigh the risk of coalition collapse and electoral backlash. In some cases, political assassinations and threats of violence against domestic opponents of the peace process have added to the sense of danger for leaders who pursue compromises.
Leadership changes have also interrupted continuity. Negotiations often take years of accumulated knowledge and incremental confidence building. When governments change, new leaders may not feel bound by prior understandings that were never fully codified. They may also seek to differentiate themselves from predecessors by rejecting or revising earlier frameworks, which can lead the other side to doubt the value of investing in long, delicate negotiations.
External Actors and Conflicting Mediation Agendas
International actors have played major roles in promoting, shaping, and sometimes constraining peace efforts. However, their interests and approaches have not always aligned with the needs of a durable settlement.
The United States has often been the main mediator, but has also been a close ally of Israel. Many Palestinians and some international observers have argued that this has made US mediation less effective, since Israel has rarely faced strong consequences from Washington for actions seen as undermining talks, such as settlement expansion. At the same time, many Israelis have viewed US involvement as essential for their security concerns and for guaranteeing any future agreement.
Other states and organizations have brought their own priorities. Some neighboring Arab states have supported Palestinian positions, but have also pursued their own regional strategies. European actors have often emphasized international law and human rights, yet have lacked the leverage to enforce their preferences. Rivalry among external sponsors and differing diplomatic frameworks have sometimes produced overlapping initiatives that compete rather than reinforce one another.
In some cases, external backers of different Palestinian or Israeli factions have encouraged hard line positions or have provided material support that strengthened rejectionist groups. Sanctions, boycotts, or military aid from outside powers have sometimes been used in ways that prioritize broader regional contests over the specific needs of the peace process.
The result has been a mediation environment in which no single actor has both the will and the balanced leverage to insist on implementation of difficult compromises by both sides, and in which partial agreements can be blocked or diluted by outside pressures.
Process Design: Incrementalism and Ambiguity
Many peace efforts have been based on a step by step approach. Instead of solving all core issues at once, negotiators agreed to a series of interim measures, with final status questions postponed. This incrementalism was intended to build trust, create positive facts on the ground, and make later compromises easier.
In practice, interim arrangements have often become semi permanent, while final status issues have remained unresolved. Temporary boundaries, provisional authorities, and partial withdrawals have created new patterns of control without delivering clear political horizons. Each side has accused the other of exploiting the interim phases to improve its bargaining position rather than to prepare for genuine peace.
Ambiguity in language has been another common tool of process design. Vague formulas have allowed leaders to sign documents without fully resolving disagreements. This has enabled breakthroughs at moments of crisis, but has frequently stored up trouble for later, when different interpretations collide during implementation. When disputes over meaning have arisen, there has not always been an agreed enforcement or arbitration mechanism capable of imposing a binding resolution.
Timetables and benchmarks have often been optimistic, assuming political stability and goodwill that did not exist. When deadlines passed without full implementation, or when partial steps were taken out of sequence, the credibility of the entire process suffered. This pattern has led many on both sides to conclude that negotiation frameworks are fragile and easily manipulated.
Legitimacy, Public Opinion, and Societal Division
Even when leaders have reached understandings at the negotiating table, transforming these into broad public support has been difficult. Large sections of both societies have remained skeptical or hostile to compromise.
Among Israelis, repeated exposure to violence and deep fears about security have made many voters wary of territorial concessions. Among Palestinians, experiences of occupation, displacement, and unmet promises have produced widespread suspicion that negotiations are a trap. Hard line groups on both sides have portrayed peace initiatives as either existential threats or acts of surrender.
This skepticism has been reinforced by education systems, media narratives, and collective memories that often highlight the suffering inflicted by the other side more than the suffering experienced by it. Historical traumas are kept alive in public discourse, while the experiences of the other community are frequently minimized or questioned. Under these conditions, leaders who advocate compromise must constantly prove that they are not naive or disloyal.
Referendums, elections, and internal party processes have at times served as tests of legitimacy for proposed agreements. The possibility of being punished at the ballot box for perceived concessions has made some leaders choose short term political survival over long term risk taking. Conversely, when leaders have moved ahead without broad social preparation, agreements have been more vulnerable to later reversal or neglect.
The Persistence of the Status Quo
Finally, many peace efforts have failed because, for long stretches, key actors have been able to live with the existing situation, even if they have not publicly endorsed it. The costs of the status quo have been very high, especially for Palestinians living under occupation and blockade, but the political systems of powerful actors have often been able to absorb those costs without facing decisive pressure to change course.
For Israel, the combination of military superiority, economic growth, and strategic alliances has made managing the conflict seem more feasible than risking far reaching territorial and symbolic concessions. For some Palestinian factions, the continuation of struggle and resistance has been a source of internal legitimacy, access to external support, or control over local structures, which could be disrupted by the compromises that a negotiated settlement would require.
External actors have also sometimes preferred stability over the uncertainty of transformative change. Even when they have criticized aspects of the situation, the risk of destabilization has led some governments to accept limited, reversible steps rather than press hard for comprehensive solutions.
As long as the balance between the costs of conflict and the perceived risks of compromise remains as it has been, negotiations tend to produce partial, fragile arrangements rather than durable peace. The failure of past efforts is not simply the result of one flawed proposal or one missed opportunity, but of a recurring pattern in which structural imbalances, deep mistrust, conflicting aims, and insufficient incentives for genuine transformation reinforce one another and block a final agreement.