Table of Contents
Setting the Stage: One People, Two Governments
The political split between Gaza and the West Bank refers to the fact that Palestinians in these two territories are governed by rival authorities that compete for power and legitimacy. Since 2007, the Gaza Strip has been controlled by Hamas, while the Palestinian Authority, dominated by Fatah, has remained the main governing body in parts of the West Bank. This division is not just administrative. It shapes everyday life, elections, security forces, foreign relations, and Palestinian strategies toward Israel and the wider world.
To understand this split, it is important to see it as both a result of internal Palestinian politics and a product of regional and international pressures. It is not simply a story of two factions disagreeing. It is a story of how institutions, security structures, external backing, and different visions of resistance and negotiation produced a lasting division.
Origins of the Fatah–Hamas Rivalry
Fatah emerged in the mid twentieth century as the dominant force in the Palestinian national movement and later became the leading faction within the Palestine Liberation Organization. Hamas appeared later, during the First Intifada, as an Islamist movement with its own political and social networks. For years, they operated in parallel, often in tension but under a shared umbrella of opposition to Israeli occupation.
The rivalry hardened after the Oslo process created new governing structures in the 1990s. The Palestinian Authority was shaped largely by Fatah’s leadership and allies. Hamas opposed the Oslo Accords and rejected the approach of negotiating a gradual solution under a framework that recognized Israel without ending occupation. This disagreement over strategy, ideology, and control of security forces simmered beneath the surface and increasingly translated into competition for public support.
The 2006 Elections and the Collapse of a Power-Sharing Experiment
The direct political trigger of the split was the Palestinian legislative elections held in 2006. These elections, organized under the Palestinian Authority’s system, were widely regarded as competitive and relatively fair. Hamas, running under the banner of “Change and Reform,” won a majority of seats, partly because of public frustration with corruption and inefficiency in the existing Palestinian leadership, and partly because of its strong grassroots networks.
Fatah’s loss created an awkward institutional situation. The presidency of the Palestinian Authority remained in the hands of Mahmoud Abbas, from Fatah, while the parliamentary majority and the new government were led by Hamas. International actors, especially the United States and the European Union, refused to engage with a Hamas-led government unless it met conditions such as recognizing Israel and renouncing armed struggle. Israel also restricted contacts and movement of funds. This external pressure, combined with deep mistrust between Hamas and Fatah, made effective power-sharing nearly impossible.
Tensions grew over who controlled the security forces, ministries, and financial resources. Attempts to form a national unity government did not resolve the core question of authority. Instead, competing security structures grew stronger and more confrontational in both territories.
The 2007 Violent Split and Diverging Authorities
In mid 2007, the rivalry erupted into open conflict, especially in Gaza. Armed clashes broke out between forces loyal to Hamas and those loyal to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. The fighting was intense yet relatively brief. By June 2007, Hamas had taken control of key security installations and government offices in the Gaza Strip.
As a result, Gaza and the West Bank came under different practical authorities. Hamas established a de facto government in Gaza, while President Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Hamas-led government and appointed an emergency government based in the West Bank, which continued to claim authority over all Palestinian territories.
This point marked the formal political split. Since then, Palestinians have had two rival centers of power that each claim, in different ways, to represent the Palestinian people. The split is not recognized as legitimate statehood division under international law, but it is an enduring political and institutional reality on the ground.
Different Governance Models in Gaza and the West Bank
The political split quickly led to distinct systems of governance. In Gaza, Hamas built up its own security apparatus, public institutions, and administrative structures, some of which replaced or absorbed previous Palestinian Authority bodies. It also used its control of territory to consolidate political dominance and, at times, to suppress rivals and dissenting voices.
In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority under Fatah remained dependent on international aid and cooperation with Israel in many areas, particularly security coordination. Over time, the PA developed its own technocratic and security-focused style of governance. While it maintained formal claims to represent all Palestinians, it largely exercised direct control only in certain parts of the West Bank designated by earlier agreements.
These different models produced two contrasting political environments. In Gaza, the ruling authority faced repeated conflicts with Israel, lacked broad international recognition, and operated under a blockade. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority tried to maintain international support and security cooperation, while often being criticized domestically for perceived weakness and lack of democratic renewal. The split became a self-reinforcing cycle, as each side used control of its territory to entrench its own institutions.
Impact on Elections, Representation, and Legitimacy
The political division has had a profound impact on Palestinian political representation. After the 2006 elections, no new national legislative elections were held for many years, partly because of the inability to agree on rules that would be accepted by both sides. Presidential elections were also delayed. Both Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank continued to govern without renewed popular mandates.
This situation led to questions about legitimacy. Many Palestinians see both authorities as unrepresentative or at least outdated, yet there is no agreed mechanism to replace or reform them. Attempts to hold unified elections have repeatedly failed, often at late stages, due to disagreements over participation in East Jerusalem, security conditions, or political calculations by the rival leaderships.
The split has also complicated the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which historically claimed to represent Palestinians everywhere, not just in the territories. The relationship between the PLO leadership and Hamas has remained contested, and this has affected who speaks in international forums and who negotiates with external actors.
Security Coordination and Internal Repression
Security structures are a key part of the split. In the West Bank, Palestinian Authority security forces coordinate extensively with Israeli forces. Supporters of this approach argue that it reduces violence and maintains some stability. Critics argue that it turns the PA into a subcontractor for occupation and undermines its legitimacy.
In Gaza, Hamas maintains its own security forces and armed wing. Its security practices have included policing internal dissent, controlling protests, and limiting the activities of rival factions. The separation of security systems means that Palestinian factions in one territory cannot operate freely in the other, and that arrests and political restrictions may be used to prevent organizing by the rival group.
This situation has created a climate where political pluralism is constrained on both sides. People who criticize the local authority or show support for its rival can face arrest, harassment, or loss of employment. The split therefore affects not only relations at the top but also the daily political freedoms of ordinary Palestinians.
Effects on Daily Life and Socioeconomic Conditions
While the broader humanitarian and economic conditions of Gaza and the West Bank are addressed elsewhere, the political split shapes those conditions in specific ways. Funding streams, salaries, and public services are divided between two bureaucracies. For example, teachers or civil servants may be paid by one authority but work in areas influenced by another, which creates conflicts over loyalty and policy.
The split complicates social and family ties, because movement between the two territories is already restricted for other reasons. Institutions such as universities, professional unions, and NGOs often need to navigate two sets of political expectations and regulations. Projects that aim to serve all Palestinians frequently face obstacles when trying to operate across the divide.
The rivalry also affects the way aid is distributed. International donors may channel support through the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, while others may work with or around the de facto authorities in Gaza. This can lead to uneven development, competition over reconstruction funds, and accusations of favoritism or political manipulation.
Regional and International Involvement in the Split
External actors have played significant roles in reinforcing or challenging the split. Some states and organizations support the Palestinian Authority as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and refuse any formal dealings with Hamas. Others maintain channels with both sides or provide direct assistance to Gaza under Hamas control, usually framed as humanitarian support rather than political recognition.
Neighboring countries have hosted reconciliation talks, while at times also favoring one faction over another according to their own regional interests and ideological alignments. This external involvement means that internal Palestinian reconciliation is not only a domestic issue but is intertwined with broader regional power politics and alliances.
Sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Hamas after the 2006 elections contributed to the early breakdown of shared governance. Later, periodic efforts at mediation by regional powers or international organizations have focused on forming unity governments, reforming security forces, or arranging temporary understandings in Gaza. However, long term political unity has remained elusive.
Reconciliation Attempts and Repeated Failures
Since 2007, numerous agreements have been announced to end the split, including deals signed in places such as Cairo, Doha, and Gaza City itself. These agreements often contain similar elements. They call for forming a national unity government, integrating security services, holding elections, and reforming the PLO to include Hamas and other factions.
Despite repeated announcements of progress, implementation has usually stalled. Key obstacles include control of weapons and security forces, integration of civil servants hired after the split, and fear by each side that elections might weaken its position. Trust between leaders and rank and file remains very low, and each side suspects the other of seeking dominance rather than partnership.
Occasional unity or technocratic governments have been formed on paper, but they rarely gained real authority on the ground in Gaza, where Hamas retained effective control of security, or in the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority preserved its own security arrangement. This pattern has led to public skepticism about reconciliation efforts, even as many Palestinians continue to support the idea of political unity in principle.
Strategic Consequences for the Palestinian National Project
The political split has weakened the coherence of the Palestinian national movement. When dealing with Israel or in international forums, Palestinians present multiple and sometimes conflicting positions. One center of power prioritizes international diplomacy and negotiation, while the other places greater emphasis on armed resistance and regional alliances. This makes it harder to formulate and implement a unified strategy.
The division also affects how the world perceives the prospects for any political solution. Some external actors argue that no comprehensive agreement can be implemented as long as there are two rival Palestinian governments, especially when one is not recognized as a legitimate negotiating partner. Others argue that focusing too much on the split ignores underlying issues of occupation and rights that unite Palestinians despite their political differences.
For many Palestinians, the split is viewed as a major setback to national aspirations. It divides resources, fragments leadership, and provides arguments for those who claim that Palestinians are not united enough to manage independent statehood. At the same time, supporters of each side often argue that their leaders are defending core principles that the other has abandoned, whether those principles are resistance or diplomacy.
Social and Psychological Dimensions of Division
Beyond institutions and strategies, the political split has social and psychological consequences. Identities can become tied to factional loyalties, with people in Gaza and the West Bank exposed to different media, narratives, and local authorities. Over time, separate experiences of war, siege, and political life contribute to subtly different perspectives within the Palestinian community.
However, it is important to note that the split is not a simple separation of two societies. Family connections, shared culture, and common experiences of displacement and occupation continue to bind Palestinians together. Many activists, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens express frustration with both leaderships and call for unity from below, even when formal political reconciliation remains blocked.
The tension between shared identity and divided politics is one of the defining features of the Palestinian situation in the era of the Gaza–West Bank split. It influences how younger generations see their future, how they relate to political institutions, and how they imagine possible paths toward self determination or coexistence.
The Split as a Moving, Not Static, Reality
Although the division between Gaza and the West Bank has now lasted for many years, it is not a frozen situation. Power balances between factions shift over time, especially in response to wars, protests, economic crises, or external diplomatic moves. Changes in regional politics, such as normalization agreements or shifting alliances, can strengthen or weaken particular Palestinian actors.
Within each territory, public opinion toward the governing authorities also evolves, influenced by security conditions, economic hardship, and perceptions of corruption or effectiveness. Periods of mass protest, such as those triggered by specific events, sometimes reveal widespread frustration with the split itself.
Understanding the political split between Gaza and the West Bank requires keeping in view its origins in contested elections and violent confrontation, its reinforcement through separate institutions and external policies, and its ongoing impact on representation, strategy, and everyday life. It is a central feature of contemporary Palestinian politics and a key obstacle that shapes any discussion of future solutions.