Table of Contents
Introduction to the Regional Context
Neighboring Arab states have been central to the Israel–Palestine conflict from its earliest phases until today. They have shaped wars and ceasefires, hosted and constrained Palestinian communities, offered political and financial support, and at times used the conflict to pursue their own regional ambitions. Their policies have often combined genuine solidarity with the Palestinian cause with calculations about regime survival, territorial control, and international alliances. To understand the conflict as it actually functions, it is essential to see how Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and other Arab states have interacted with both Israel and the Palestinians over time.
Egypt: From Leading Belligerent to Security Partner
Egypt was the most populous and militarily significant Arab state when the State of Israel was declared, and it took a leading role in early wars. Egyptian forces entered the 1948–1949 war and ended up controlling the Gaza Strip afterward. Gaza remained under Egyptian administration until 1967, but Egypt did not annex it or grant its residents Egyptian citizenship. This left Gaza in a politically ambiguous position that shaped later developments.
Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt promoted a pan-Arab vision in which the Palestinian struggle was part of a broader Arab confrontation with Israel and with Western influence. The 1956 Suez Crisis, when Israel, Britain, and France attacked Egypt after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, strengthened Nasser’s status as a champion of Arab nationalism and hardened regional opposition to Israel.
Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war, and the loss of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza, marked a turning point. The loss undermined Nasser’s pan-Arab project and pushed Egypt, over the next decade, toward a more state-centered strategy focused on regaining Sinai. Under President Anwar Sadat, Egypt fought the 1973 war, partly to break a diplomatic stalemate and pave the way for negotiations. This led eventually to the Camp David Accords and the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, in which Egypt regained Sinai in exchange for recognizing Israel and making security arrangements.
For Palestinians, Egypt’s separate peace was a deep shock. Many saw it as a betrayal that weakened collective Arab leverage on Israel. Egypt was temporarily suspended from the Arab League and faced intense criticism. Over time, however, most Arab governments resumed relations with Cairo, recognizing its enduring weight in the region.
After the peace treaty, Egypt became a key mediator between Israel and different Palestinian actors, especially in relation to Gaza. It has frequently brokered ceasefires between Israel and Palestinian factions, particularly Hamas and Islamic Jihad, while also participating in the blockade regime on Gaza through control of the Rafah crossing. Egyptian policy toward Gaza has balanced domestic security concerns, fear of Islamist movements, economic pressures, and a desire to maintain international support, especially from the United States.
Jordan: Custodian, Neighbor, and Former Ruler of the West Bank
Jordan has a unique position due to its historical rule over the West Bank and its large Palestinian-origin population. During the 1948–1949 war, Jordanian forces took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, annexing them in 1950. This annexation was recognized by only a few states but it made Jordan directly responsible for a large number of Palestinian residents. Many Palestinians acquired Jordanian citizenship, and Palestinian elites played important roles in Jordanian society, even as tensions persisted over representation and power.
Jordan’s involvement with the Palestinian national movement was complicated. While the Jordanian monarchy initially portrayed itself as a defender of Palestinian rights, it was wary of independent Palestinian organizations that might challenge Hashemite rule or seek to incorporate Jordan into a broader Palestinian or Arab entity. These tensions erupted in the events often referred to as “Black September” in 1970–1971, when fighting between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrilla groups led to the expulsion of many armed Palestinian organizations from Jordan. Afterward, the Palestine Liberation Organization moved its main base of operations to Lebanon.
Jordan continued to participate in Arab-Israeli wars and diplomatic efforts, but it gradually moved toward a negotiated approach. In 1988, Jordan formally renounced its claim to the West Bank, recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. This set the stage for later bilateral negotiations. In 1994, after the Oslo framework had been agreed, Jordan signed its own peace treaty with Israel. That treaty defined borders, security cooperation, and arrangements concerning water resources and economic ties.
Religiously and symbolically, Jordan holds a special status through its recognized custodianship of Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, particularly the Haram al Sharif / Temple Mount compound. This custodianship has roots in earlier eras and was reaffirmed in various agreements. It gives Jordan a direct stake in questions surrounding Jerusalem and often places it at the center of diplomatic and religious disputes when tensions arise there.
Inside Jordan, the large Palestinian-origin population influences domestic politics. The monarchy must manage public sympathy for Palestinians and opposition to Israeli policies, while also preserving the peace treaty and security coordination with Israel that are central to Jordan’s stability and its international relationships. This internal balancing act shapes how Jordan responds to escalations, peace talks, and proposals that touch on issues like refugees and borders.
Syria: Strategic Confrontation and the Golan Heights
Syria’s role has been shaped by its ideological stance, its territorial dispute with Israel, and its relationships with Palestinian and Lebanese actors. Successive Syrian governments presented themselves as uncompromising opponents of Israel and Western influence. Syria clashed with Israel in 1948, in smaller border skirmishes, and in larger wars. In 1967, it lost the Golan Heights to Israel, a loss that remains unresolved and central to Syrian policy.
The Golan Heights has both strategic and symbolic importance. From the Syrian perspective, regaining this territory is a national priority and a condition for any comprehensive peace. Several rounds of negotiations took place in the 1990s and early 2000s about a possible Israeli withdrawal and normalization, but no agreement was reached. Israel later effectively extended its law to the Golan, a move that Syria and most of the international community do not recognize.
Syria has hosted and influenced various Palestinian factions, often favoring groups closely aligned with its regional strategy and with its alliance with Iran. Some Palestinian organizations, including those that opposed the PLO’s compromises or engaged in armed struggle from outside the Palestinian territories, found support and bases in Syria. At the same time, Syria has sometimes clashed with Palestinian groups that it viewed as rivals or as threats to Syrian control, particularly in the context of Lebanon and the Lebanese civil war.
The Syrian state’s approach made the Palestinian cause part of a broader resistance narrative, tying it to struggles in Lebanon and to opposition to American and Israeli influence in the region. However, the Syrian civil war that began in 2011 severely weakened the state and fragmented its regional role. Different Palestinian communities in Syria were drawn into or affected by the conflict, and Syrian focus shifted from confrontation with Israel to internal survival. This upheaval reduced Syria’s ability to shape the Israel–Palestine conflict directly, though its alliances and the presence of non-state actors near the Golan continue to have implications for security dynamics.
Lebanon: Refugee Host, Battlefield, and Frontline
Lebanon’s role is heavily marked by the presence of Palestinian refugees and by the ways Palestinian activism intersected with Lebanon’s own fragile political system. After 1948 and subsequent wars, large numbers of Palestinian refugees settled in camps in Lebanon. Unlike in Jordan, most did not receive citizenship, and they were subject to restrictions on work, property ownership, and movement. Lebanese authorities justified these policies partly as a way to preserve the right of return and partly due to internal sectarian concerns about demographic balance and political power sharing.
The arrival and political mobilization of Palestinians contributed to Lebanon’s instability, especially from the late 1960s onward, though they were not the sole cause. The PLO’s move to Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan gave Palestinian guerrilla forces a base close to northern Israel. Cross border attacks and Israeli retaliations intensified, and Lebanese territory became a major arena of conflict, culminating in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. That invasion led to the PLO’s evacuation to Tunisia and had severe humanitarian and political consequences within Lebanon itself.
Within Lebanon, Palestinian armed presence and the broader conflict interacted with the Lebanese civil war, drawing in Syria, Israel, and various Lebanese militias. Palestinian civilians in Lebanon, as well as armed groups, sometimes faced violence from Lebanese actors as well as from Israel. The status of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has remained precarious, with their rights and living conditions in camps continuing to be a contentious domestic issue.
Over time, another actor, Hezbollah, emerged as the main armed opponent of Israel from Lebanese territory. Although Hezbollah is not a Palestinian organization, it presents itself as part of the broader “resistance” front against Israel and coordinates with Palestinian factions at times. This adds another layer to Lebanon’s role, as the country remains a potential front for conflict between Israel and non-state actors allied with regional powers.
Other Arab States: Support, Distance, and Conditional Solidarity
Beyond the immediate neighbors, other Arab states have influenced the conflict through political declarations, financial aid, and sometimes military involvement. Iraq, for example, sent troops in earlier Arab-Israeli wars and later used the Palestinian cause as part of its broader Arab nationalist posture. During the Gulf War period and after, Iraq’s rhetoric and support for certain Palestinian factions were also part of its contest with rival Arab regimes and Western powers.
Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, have played important roles mainly through funding, diplomacy, and media. Saudi Arabia sponsored significant peace proposals, including initiatives that promised comprehensive Arab normalization with Israel in exchange for withdrawal from occupied territories and a just solution for Palestinian refugees. These initiatives shaped regional discussions and informed official Arab positions for many years.
Gulf funding has supported Palestinian institutions, reconstruction efforts, religious endowments, and sometimes particular factions. At the same time, Gulf states have often prioritized their own security concerns, alliances with Western powers, and rivalries with Iran and each other. This has led to periods in which the Palestinian issue was central to Arab summits and periods in which it appeared to be sidelined.
The rise of political Islam and later the upheavals of the Arab uprisings affected how different Arab governments related to Palestinian movements, especially ones like Hamas that combine Islamist ideology with nationalist goals. Some states saw in these movements allies or instruments, while others saw potential threats to their own regimes. This resulted in shifting alliances, financial support that rose or fell, and varying degrees of political backing.
Balancing Solidarity and State Interests
Throughout the history of the conflict, neighboring Arab states have invoked a shared Arab and often Islamic identity to express solidarity with Palestinians. Public opinion across much of the Arab world has consistently shown deep sympathy for the Palestinian cause and anger over occupation, violence, and perceived injustices. Governments have had to respond to these sentiments, particularly during times of escalation, by issuing strong statements, hosting summits, or recalling ambassadors.
At the same time, Arab states have had their own priorities. Regime survival, economic development, internal sectarian or ethnic balances, relations with major powers, and rivalries with other regional states have all influenced how they act. The result is that Arab support for Palestinians has sometimes been generous and sometimes limited or highly conditional. Decisions by Egypt and Jordan to make peace with Israel, by some Gulf states to normalize relations, and by others to reduce the prominence of the Palestinian issue in regional forums show the impact of state-centered calculations.
For Palestinians, this mixture of solidarity and self-interest has meant that Arab backing is important but not always reliable. Neighboring states have provided refuge, training bases, financing, and diplomatic cover, but they have also restricted Palestinian political activity, intervened in internal Palestinian politics, and pursued separate deals or policies that do not always align with Palestinian priorities.
Neighboring States and the Evolution of the Conflict
The role of neighboring Arab states has evolved as regional power balances, ideologies, and global alignments have changed. Early on, the conflict was often framed as a confrontation between Israel and the Arab world as a whole, with neighboring states as direct belligerents. Over time, as some of those neighbors made peace with Israel, as new non-state actors emerged, and as conflicts within Arab states intensified, the picture has become more fragmented.
Today, neighboring Arab states are less likely to engage in full-scale war with Israel, but they remain deeply entangled in the conflict. They host large Palestinian populations, they control borders and crossings, they mediate ceasefires and negotiations, and they serve as arenas where regional rivalries play out. Their policies help determine the economic conditions in places like Gaza, the diplomatic options open to Palestinian leaders, and the security environment around Israel’s borders.
Understanding these roles does not mean assuming a single Arab “position” or a fixed pattern of behavior. Instead, it means recognizing that each neighboring Arab state has its own history with the conflict, its own internal pressures, and its own calculations, which together make the Israel–Palestine conflict a truly regional issue rather than only a bilateral one.