Normalization Agreements

Introduction to Normalization in the Region

Normalization agreements refer to formal arrangements in which Arab or Muslim majority states establish open, regular diplomatic, economic, and often security relations with Israel. In earlier decades, peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan were exceptional cases, closely tied to specific wars and territorial issues. In the twenty first century, especially since 2020, normalization has increasingly become part of a broader regional realignment that is less directly tied to resolving the Palestinian question.

This chapter focuses on how these agreements developed, what they contain, how they are linked to wider power politics in the Middle East, and what they mean for Israelis, Palestinians, and the future of the conflict.

Historical Precedents: Egypt and Jordan

The first models for normalization were the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and between Israel and Jordan in 1994. Both emerged from direct military confrontations and both involved land issues. Egypt regained the Sinai Peninsula and Jordan regularized control and arrangements along the Jordan River and around shared borders.

These treaties showed that Arab states could, under certain conditions, break with the earlier collective stance of no recognition, no negotiations, and no peace with Israel. However, normalization remained narrow and largely state driven. Trade existed, security cooperation was significant, but social acceptance within Egyptian and Jordanian societies lagged. The Palestinian issue remained central to Arab public opinion, which limited how deep normalization could go.

These earlier treaties became reference points later. Supporters of new agreements often point to the strategic benefits for Egypt and Jordan. Critics note the limited progress for Palestinians despite decades of peace between Israel and those neighbors.

From the Arab Peace Initiative to Bilateral Deals

In 2002, the Arab League adopted the Arab Peace Initiative. It offered collective normalization with Israel in exchange for full withdrawal from occupied territories, a just solution for Palestinian refugees, and the creation of a Palestinian state. The proposal framed normalization as a reward at the end of a comprehensive peace process.

For many years, this initiative did not translate into bilateral treaties, but it helped establish a formula. It signaled that normalization was possible, but it linked that possibility to concrete steps on the Palestinian track. Over time, however, some states began to separate their own national calculus from that formal collective position.

Several regional shifts contributed to this. The rise of Iran as a perceived threat to some Arab governments, the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and changing relations with global powers all pushed certain states to think about security and technology partnerships beyond traditional fault lines. Quiet ties with Israel in intelligence and security matters grew, especially in the Gulf, even when public positions officially remained unchanged.

The Abraham Accords: Content and Context

In 2020, the Abraham Accords marked a break with the earlier pattern. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were the first to sign publicly announced normalization agreements with Israel without a prior full settlement of the Palestinian question. Morocco and Sudan followed with their own arrangements that same year.

These accords generally included the establishment of diplomatic relations, opening of embassies, direct flights, and agreements on trade, tourism, technology, and cooperation in sectors such as health and energy. They also often included separate side understandings between the participating Arab states and the United States, for example related to arms sales or recognition of certain territorial claims.

The context is crucial. In the years before 2020, cooperation between Israel and some Gulf states against Iran had deepened behind the scenes. At the same time, fatigue with the stalled peace process, and frustration with Palestinian political divisions, led some leaders to deprioritize waiting for a comprehensive settlement. The United States government at that time actively encouraged this shift and presented the accords as a major diplomatic achievement.

The Abraham Accords did not require Israel to end its occupation, but in the case of the UAE they were linked to a suspension of formal annexation plans for parts of the West Bank. Supporters pointed to this as evidence that normalization could moderate Israeli policies. Critics argued that it rewarded Israel without securing structural changes for Palestinians.

Country Specific Motives and Benefits

Each state that normalized with Israel did so for its own reasons, which combined security, economic, and diplomatic calculations.

For the United Arab Emirates, closer ties with Israel offered access to advanced technology, cyber capabilities, and defense cooperation. It also deepened relations with the United States, including potential arms deals. The UAE sought to position itself as a forward looking regional hub, and partnership with Israel fit that vision of innovation and high tech development.

Bahrain, which hosts a key U.S. naval base and is closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, joined as part of a broader regional alignment. The decision signaled its place within a particular Gulf security camp that sees Iran as a central threat and values strong ties with Washington.

Morocco’s agreement involved U.S. recognition of its claim over Western Sahara, a long standing diplomatic priority for Rabat. In addition, Morocco highlighted its historic Jewish community and earlier low level ties to Israel, framing normalization as a way to reconnect cultural and familial links while securing strategic benefits.

Sudan’s process was tied to its removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, which was important for economic relief and reintegration into the international system. The transition government faced both internal challenges and external pressure, and the normalization deal formed part of a broader bargaining framework with Washington, although its implementation has since been complicated by Sudan’s internal conflicts.

Security, Technology, and Economic Dimensions

Normalization agreements have a strong security and strategic component. For states worried about Iran and other non state actors, cooperation with Israel offers intelligence sharing, access to defense technologies, and joint planning on issues such as cyber security and missile defense. For Israel, these partnerships expand its regional legitimacy, reduce diplomatic isolation, and help create a network of states that share some of its threat perceptions.

Economically, normalization opens the way for investments, tourism, and trade. Israeli companies gain access to new markets in the Gulf and North Africa, while Arab partners gain Israeli expertise in fields like water management, agriculture, health technology, and renewable energy. Joint projects, such as energy and desalination initiatives, are often highlighted as practical examples of how normalization can materially benefit populations.

However, economic benefits are not evenly distributed. They tend to be concentrated in certain sectors and among specific business elites. Critics argue that when agreements focus heavily on high technology and defense, they can deepen inequalities and fail to address broader social and economic needs.

The Palestinian Question and Normalization

A central controversy around recent normalization agreements is their relationship to the Palestinian question. Earlier regional formulas conditioned recognition of Israel on a just resolution of core Palestinian issues. The Abraham Accords reversed the sequence. They offered normalization first, with only limited and often vague references to the need for negotiations and peace.

From many Palestinian perspectives, normalization without substantial Israeli concessions weakens their diplomatic leverage. It demonstrates that Israel can deepen relations with Arab states without ending the occupation or agreeing to statehood. Palestinian leaders, including both the Palestinian Authority and many civil society groups, condemned the accords as a betrayal of collective Arab commitments.

Some Arab leaders framed their decisions differently. They argued that engagement with Israel might give them more ability to influence its policies, or that blocking formal annexation constituted a concrete gain. Others claimed that building regional stability and prosperity through normalization was not incompatible with eventual progress on the Palestinian issue, although they did not spell out clear mechanisms for that progress.

Public opinion across the Arab world often diverged from official positions. Surveys and reactions suggested that popular sympathy for Palestinians remained high even in countries that normalized, and that acceptance of Israel as a normal partner was far from universal.

Normalization, Regional Coalitions, and Great Power Politics

Normalization agreements are tightly connected to broader regional and global alignments. For the United States, encouraging normalization fits with efforts to build regional coalitions that can share security burdens and counter rivals. It also allows American diplomacy to claim visible achievements even when direct Israeli Palestinian negotiations are stalled.

From the perspective of some Middle Eastern states, normalization can balance relations with multiple great powers. It signals reliability to Washington while leaving room for economic ties with Europe, China, and others. In an era when global competition shapes regional choices, links with Israel, which has close ties to Western economies and militaries, can be seen as a useful asset.

At the same time, normalization can deepen regional divides. States that normalize highlight a vision of order anchored in cooperation with the United States and sometimes with each other, while others, such as Iran and some of its allies, present themselves as defenders of resistance against Israel and foreign influence. The conflict over normalization becomes part of a larger struggle about regional identity, sovereignty, and the terms of future security architecture.

Social and Symbolic Dimensions

Normalization is not only about formal treaties. It also has symbolic and social meanings. When embassies open, when direct flights begin, and when cultural events and joint initiatives are advertised, these steps challenge long standing taboos in many Arab societies regarding contact with Israel.

Supporters of normalization argue that human contact can reduce fear and prejudice, gradually preparing the ground for more pragmatic approaches to the conflict. They emphasize the possibilities of academic exchanges, business partnerships, and tourism as ways to humanize the other side and break cycles of hostility.

Opponents, including many activists and intellectuals across the region, worry that normalization can normalize occupation itself. They argue that presenting Israel as a regular partner without insisting on concrete changes risks erasing Palestinian suffering from the regional agenda. For them, boycotts, cultural and academic refusal, and rejection of normalization serve as tools to maintain pressure for political change.

The gap between state policies and social attitudes means that normalization can remain fragile. Even when official relations exist, popular protests and boycotts can limit how far integration goes in practice, especially in sensitive fields such as sports, arts, and civil society cooperation.

Attempts at Saudi Israeli Normalization

Saudi Arabia holds a special place in regional calculations because of its size, economic weight, and role as custodian of major Islamic holy sites. For years, Saudi officials maintained an official commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative framework, which linked normalization to Palestinian statehood. At the same time, reports of quiet security contacts with Israel circulated frequently.

In recent years, negotiations over possible Saudi Israeli normalization have periodically advanced, often with active U.S. involvement. Discussions have included not only bilateral issues but also broader strategic guarantees, civilian nuclear cooperation, and defense commitments from the United States to Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian issue has been one of several variables in these complex talks.

While no full normalization has yet taken place, even partial steps, such as allowing overflights or limited contacts, signal slow shifts. The outcome of these negotiations has the potential to reshape the regional landscape. Full normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel would significantly expand the network of states with formal ties to Israel and could influence how other states position themselves.

Impact on Conflict Trajectories

Normalization agreements affect the possible futures of the Israeli Palestinian conflict in several ways. They can reduce incentives for Israel to make compromises if its integration into the region appears to advance regardless of progress with the Palestinians. On the other hand, they might create new channels of influence, where Arab partners use their access to Israel to advocate for particular steps or to mediate during crises.

These agreements also change the diplomatic environment in which Palestinians operate. Instead of dealing primarily with a united Arab bloc that conditions relations on their cause, Palestinian leaders now navigate a more complex map. Some neighboring states have formal partnerships with Israel, others strongly oppose normalization, and many balance between these poles.

Normalization can also influence the internal debates within Israel and Palestinian society. In Israel, proponents of a more confrontational posture may feel reinforced by new alliances, while critics warn that ignoring Palestinian rights remains dangerous. Among Palestinians, disagreements deepen between those who seek engagement with normalized states to gain advantages and those who see any cooperation with them as undermining the national struggle.

Contested Legitimacy and Future Debates

The legitimacy of normalization is deeply contested. For some regional elites and external powers, these agreements are a pragmatic adjustment to realities, a recognition that states must prioritize their own security and economic interests. They present normalization as a pathway to stability and modernization, even if the Palestinian issue remains unresolved.

For many others, especially within Palestinian society and among broader Arab and Muslim publics, normalization without justice appears as an abandonment. The memory of earlier collective positions and the ongoing experience of occupation shape how these agreements are perceived. The moral question of whether normal relations are acceptable while a core political and human rights problem persists remains unresolved.

Future normalization moves, whether by additional Arab states or by other Muslim majority countries, will continue to provoke these debates. How much they shape the conflict will depend on whether they are linked to concrete improvements in Palestinian lives and to credible political processes, or whether they proceed largely disconnected from those concerns.

Normalization agreements therefore sit at the intersection of regional power politics, global competition, and local struggles for rights and recognition. They are neither a simple path to peace nor just a betrayal, but part of a new, contested landscape in which the Israel Palestine conflict is increasingly entangled with broader strategic and diplomatic realignments.