Public Opinion Trends

Shifting Attitudes in a Prolonged Conflict

Public opinion in Israel, in the Palestinian territories, and internationally has changed repeatedly over the decades. These changes track wars, uprisings, diplomatic initiatives, and broader political and social trends. Understanding public opinion trends does not mean predicting exact future behavior, but it does help explain why certain leaders, parties, and policies gain or lose support at particular moments.

In this chapter, the focus is on patterns rather than one specific poll. Exact numbers vary by source and by date, but several recurring tendencies can be seen over time. It is also important to remember that “Israeli opinion” and “Palestinian opinion” are not single unified things. They are collections of many different groups, with different experiences, fears, and hopes, that sometimes move in similar directions and sometimes in opposite ones.

Measuring Opinion in a Conflict Zone

Surveying public opinion in a conflict context faces particular challenges. Pollsters must work around security closures, language differences, mistrust of authorities, fear of surveillance, and respondent fatigue. Organizations that regularly survey Israelis include academic institutes and media outlets. For Palestinians, research centers in the West Bank and Gaza and some international groups conduct polls.

Despite the difficulties, repeated surveys, when taken together, reveal long term trends. Researchers often ask similar questions again and again. For example, questions about support for a two state solution, views on violence versus negotiations, trust in leadership, or optimism about the future. Comparing answers over many years shows both short term reactions to events and slower, generational changes.

Israeli Public Opinion: From Early Optimism to Deep Skepticism

In Israel, public opinion has moved through several broad phases since the late twentieth century. During the years around the Oslo Accords, many Jewish Israelis expressed cautious optimism that negotiations might end the conflict. Support for a two state solution, with territorial compromises, became part of the political mainstream, even among some center right voters. Palestinian attacks during those years did not eliminate support for talks, but they did create doubts about whether peace could be achieved quickly.

The Second Intifada produced a sharp change. The years of frequent attacks inside Israeli cities and harsh military responses reduced trust in Palestinian leaders among Jewish Israelis. Support for major concessions declined, and many people shifted toward more security focused positions. The construction of the separation barrier, targeted killings, and large scale military operations gained broad backing at the time, as many citizens felt that any alternative had failed.

Since then, Israeli Jewish opinion has been influenced by cycles of confrontation, especially with Gaza, and by internal political struggles. Repeated rounds of fighting typically produce short term surges in support for strong military responses and for leaders who promise security. Over the longer term, a sense of “managing” rather than solving the conflict has taken root among many. For some, this means resignation that there is “no partner” for peace. For others, it expresses fatigue and a desire not to think about the conflict at all, so long as daily life feels relatively stable.

Within Israeli society, however, there are deep divisions. Jewish Israelis on the left and parts of the center continue to support a two state framework and emphasize ending occupation. Many on the right prefer maintaining Israeli control over large parts of the West Bank and view a Palestinian state as too risky. Among Palestinian citizens of Israel, who vote and participate in Israeli politics, there is strong concern about discrimination and about the situation in the occupied territories, combined with varying levels of engagement with Jewish political partners. Events such as wars in Gaza, attacks inside Israel, or changes in government coalitions shift opinions within each of these groups in different ways.

Another notable trend is declining trust in political institutions. Multiple elections in quick succession, corruption cases, and intense polarization have caused many Israelis to doubt that their leaders can either keep them safe or reach a diplomatic solution. For some, this lack of trust increases support for strong personalities. For others, it feeds cynicism and disengagement from politics altogether.

Palestinian Public Opinion: Between Hope, Despair, and Resistance

Among Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, public opinion has also shifted with key events. The early years of the peace process brought significant support for negotiations, based on hopes that a state would emerge. Disappointment with the outcomes, continued settlement expansion, and the experience of the Second Intifada undermined many people’s belief that diplomacy could deliver independence or equal rights.

In surveys, Palestinian respondents often report high levels of frustration and pessimism. Support for a two state solution rises when there are concrete diplomatic moves or prisoner releases and when violence decreases. It tends to fall when talks stall or when military operations cause large numbers of casualties. Support for armed struggle shows the opposite pattern. It rises after severe Israeli actions or in moments when people feel that nonviolent efforts have been ignored, and falls somewhat when there are ceasefires or small improvements in living conditions.

Internal politics strongly affect these attitudes. The political split between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza influences perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness. Many Palestinians express dissatisfaction with both leaderships, citing corruption, lack of democratic renewal, and failure to achieve national goals. At the same time, support for a particular group can spike after it is seen as successfully resisting Israel or providing social services.

A significant trend in recent years is the rise of skepticism toward both the two state model and traditional leadership structures, especially among younger Palestinians. Many younger respondents express more interest in rights based frameworks, such as equal citizenship in a single political entity, than in a narrow focus on borders. This does not reflect a single unified program, but it does indicate a sense that the old formulas have not worked.

In Gaza, repeated wars, blockade, and severe humanitarian conditions create a different environment from the West Bank. Opinion there often combines anger at Israel with anger at local authorities. Support for confrontation can coexist with despair about what further conflict will mean for ordinary life. Moments of promised reconstruction, easing of restrictions, or international attention can briefly raise hopes, but repeated disappointments deepen a feeling that the future is closed.

Support for a Two State Solution and Alternatives

Across both Israeli and Palestinian societies, support for the classic two state idea has generally declined from the peak years after Oslo. Pollsters who have tracked this over decades often find that support rises and falls but, in the absence of real diplomatic progress, tends to gradually erode on both sides.

On the Israeli side, reasons for declining support include security fears, a belief that withdrawing from territory leads to more attacks, and a perception that there is no credible Palestinian partner. On the Palestinian side, reasons include lack of trust that Israel will actually end occupation and allow a viable state, anger over continued settlement growth, and disappointment with past negotiations.

At the same time, alternatives, such as a single binational state, confederation models, or ongoing conflict without a clear political resolution, also face skepticism. Many Israelis see a single state with equal voting rights as a threat to the Jewish majority character of Israel. Many Palestinians doubt that any single state led by current Israeli institutions would actually grant them full equality. Proposals for confederation, which would maintain separate national frameworks while sharing some institutions, are unfamiliar to much of the public and usually attract limited support in polls, although some small groups on both sides promote them.

Public opinion on these future arrangements is often “soft.” When people are given detailed scenarios that include practical steps, security guarantees, or international involvement, support can shift significantly. This suggests that opinion is sensitive to how options are presented and to whether people feel that their basic needs and identities will be protected.

Attitudes toward Violence, Security, and Human Rights

Questions about violence and security reveal some of the deepest divisions in public opinion. On the Israeli side, there is generally wide support for strong security measures, especially after attacks. At the same time, some segments of society are increasingly concerned about human rights, rule of law, and the moral costs of indefinite occupation and recurrent wars. Among younger Israelis, opinions diverge. Some move toward more nationalist and religious positions, while others gravitate toward universal human rights and anti occupation activism.

On the Palestinian side, attitudes toward armed struggle, nonviolent protest, and diplomacy depend heavily on recent experiences. After episodes of nonviolent mobilization that appear to achieve little, support for armed resistance grows. After heavy military repression, exhaustion and desire for stability can lead people to favor ceasefires or international diplomacy. Many Palestinians express simultaneous support for multiple strategies, seeing them as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

Human rights language has become more central in international debates than in earlier decades. International audiences are increasingly familiar with terms like “occupation,” “apartheid,” or “collective punishment,” and these terms influence how they interpret events. For many Israelis, such language is seen as biased or as ignoring their security fears. For many Palestinians, it provides a vocabulary to explain their experiences. These differences shape how both communities perceive foreign criticism, international court cases, or human rights reports.

Generational and Identity Divides

Generational divides are one of the most noticeable trends in public opinion. Among both Israelis and Palestinians, people who grew up during specific events carry different memories that shape their views. Older Israelis who remember the wars of 1948 and 1967 often emphasize regional threats and national survival. Those who came of age during the Second Intifada may be more skeptical of concessions. Younger generations who have only known the separation barrier and repeated Gaza clashes encounter a conflict that feels permanent, not exceptional.

Among Palestinians, older generations remember the pre Oslo era, the First Intifada, and the days when the idea of a state first seemed tangible. Younger Palestinians have lived mainly with stalled negotiations, settlement expansion, the blockade of Gaza, and the reality of checkpoints and permits. For many of them, the peace process is not a hopeful memory but a failed promise.

Identity also plays a major role within each side. Among Israelis, differences appear between secular and religious Jews, between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi or other ethnic groups, between urban and peripheral communities, and between Jewish citizens and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Among Palestinians, divides appear between West Bank and Gaza residents, between refugees and non refugees, between urban and rural communities, and between those who live under direct military control and those in areas administered by Palestinian authorities.

These internal differences mean that broad labels such as “pro peace” or “hardline” rarely capture the full picture. For example, a person can be deeply skeptical of negotiations yet support territorial compromise if convinced that security will be guaranteed. Another person can reject the two state formula but be strongly committed to nonviolence and equal rights in a different framework.

International Opinion and Global Polarization

Public opinion about the conflict outside the region has also evolved. In many Western countries, early decades of the conflict were dominated by narratives of Israel as a small state facing hostile neighbors. Over time, images of occupation, checkpoints, and wars in Gaza have become more prominent. Among younger people in several countries, sympathy for Palestinians has grown, often linked to broader concerns about racism, colonial histories, and global inequality.

At the same time, many populations continue to identify strongly with Israel, emphasizing its democratic institutions, history of persecution of Jews in Europe, and security challenges. Religious ties, especially among some Christian groups, also shape attitudes.

Globally, social media has intensified polarization. People often encounter information that aligns with their existing views. Videos and images from the conflict spread rapidly, sometimes without context or verification, and can provoke sharp emotional reactions. As a result, international public opinion is not only divided between “pro Israeli” and “pro Palestinian” camps, but also fragmented along ideological, generational, and national lines.

This international dimension matters because foreign governments often respond to their own publics. Changes in opinion among voters in the United States, Europe, or the wider Middle East can influence diplomatic positions, aid decisions, and the degree of pressure placed on local actors.

The Role of Media, Social Networks, and Information Environments

Media environments strongly affect public opinion trends. In Israel, mainstream news organizations and talk shows shape how events are framed, which experts are invited, and which Palestinian voices are heard or ignored. In the Palestinian territories, local media, satellite channels, and online platforms present their own narratives, shaped by censorship, political pressures, and the practical limits of reporting under occupation and blockade.

Social media allows individuals to bypass traditional outlets and share raw images, personal testimonies, and activist campaigns. It also enables misinformation, rumors, and dehumanizing language to circulate rapidly. Algorithms that reward engagement tend to amplify anger and outrage more than nuanced discussion. This dynamic can harden attitudes on both sides, since people mainly see the worst behavior of the other community, not the quieter daily interactions or efforts at cooperation.

At the same time, digital spaces also host cross border conversations, joint initiatives, and minority voices that challenge dominant narratives. The impact of these more constructive uses of social media on overall public opinion is still uncertain, but they demonstrate that information environments are not fixed. They are constantly reshaped by technological changes, regulations, and user behavior.

Volatility, Contradictions, and the Limits of Polls

A final feature of public opinion trends in this conflict is their volatility and internal contradiction. People often hold mixed or even conflicting views. An individual can believe that “there is no partner for peace” yet still support a negotiated settlement under certain conditions. A person can oppose attacks on civilians in principle but express approval when such attacks are seen as revenge for perceived injustices. Many respondents express strong emotions in surveys, yet in their daily lives focus mainly on work, family, and local concerns.

Poll numbers can change quickly as a result of a single high profile event, a dramatic speech, or a military escalation. Support for a leader can swing within weeks. However, underlying attitudes, such as basic fears, deep grievances, and long term narratives of history, move more slowly. Polls are snapshots. To understand trends, it is necessary to view many snapshots over time and to consider social, economic, and political contexts.

Public opinion does not mechanically determine policy. Leaders sometimes move ahead of their publics and try to shift opinion. At other times, they follow existing moods. Yet any realistic assessment of possible futures must take these trends seriously. They influence which proposals are considered politically possible, which compromises voters might accept, and which paths are likely to face immediate rejection.

In the context of current developments, public opinion on both sides shows a mixture of fatigue, fear, and hardened positions, but also persistent minorities committed to different kinds of coexistence or transformation. These complex and often conflicting attitudes will shape how the conflict evolves, how leaders act, and how societies respond to whatever comes next.