From 1949 to 1967

Postwar Borders and the New Status Quo

The period from 1949 to 1967 begins with a landscape that is militarily quiet but politically unresolved. The 1948 war has ended, but no comprehensive peace treaties exist. Instead, Israel and its neighbors have signed armistice agreements that define ceasefire lines rather than permanent borders. These lines, often called the 1949 Armistice Lines or the Green Line, separate Israel from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Within these boundaries, Israel controls more territory than what the 1947 UN Partition Plan had proposed, including western Jerusalem and large parts of what had been designated for an Arab state. The Gaza Strip comes under Egyptian military administration, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, is controlled and later annexed by Jordan. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees are outside these lines, living in neighboring countries and in Gaza and the West Bank, and their situation remains unresolved.

Although open warfare has paused, none of the Arab states recognize Israel, and Israel regards the surrounding region as hostile. Each side views the new map as temporary. Israel focuses on consolidating state institutions and absorbing new immigrants, while Arab states and Palestinian refugees see the armistice as a pause before a possible future confrontation or revision of the outcome. The absence of formal peace and the presence of unresolved refugee claims give this period a fragile and often tense character.

Political Alignments and the Cold War Context

As the global Cold War deepens, the Arab Israeli conflict becomes entangled in rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. At first, these superpower alignments are fluid. The Soviet Union initially supports Israel’s admission to the United Nations and allows some Eastern European Jewish emigration, but quickly shifts toward backing Arab states as it seeks influence in the Middle East. The United States gradually becomes Israel’s most important Western supporter, although in the early 1950s the relationship is still limited compared to later decades.

Arab states themselves are divided. Some regimes, such as the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, seek Western support and try to maintain cautious relations with both Western powers and neighboring Arab governments. Others move closer to the Soviet camp, especially after revolutions and military coups reshape regional politics. The conflict with Israel becomes one element in a broader struggle about colonial legacies, control of resources such as oil, and ideological competition between Western backed and socialist or nationalist regimes.

In this environment, arms supplies, training missions, and diplomatic backing from global powers have direct consequences on local balances of power. Arab leaders present the confrontation with Israel as part of a wider battle against Western domination, while Israel portrays itself as a small state facing encirclement in a world divided by competing blocs. These narratives help attract external allies and shape how each side interprets events on the ground.

Transformations in Neighboring Arab States

The period is marked by dramatic changes in the Arab states that border Israel. In 1952, a group of officers in Egypt known as the Free Officers Movement overthrows King Farouk and eventually brings Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. Under Nasser, Egypt adopts a strong Arab nationalist agenda, challenges British influence in the region, and presents itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. Cairo becomes a center of pan Arab rhetoric that calls for unity among Arab peoples, often with Israel’s defeat or “liberation” of Palestine as a central goal.

Jordan, which has gained control of the West Bank, faces a different set of pressures. Its population now includes a large number of Palestinians, many of them refugees in camps. The Jordanian monarchy seeks to integrate the West Bank politically, while at the same time trying to maintain its own legitimacy and manage tensions between Palestinian and East Bank Jordanian communities. Jordan’s position is delicate. On one hand it wants to avoid being isolated from fellow Arab states, and on the other it must manage direct security contact with Israel along a long and vulnerable frontier.

Syria experiences repeated political instability, including coups and short lived governments. This internal volatility influences its policy toward Israel, especially along the contested border in the Golan Heights area. While rhetoric toward Israel is often uncompromising, the capacity to implement consistent policy varies with frequent shifts in power within Damascus. Lebanon, meanwhile, tries to balance its confessional political system and domestic divisions with its role as a host to many Palestinian refugees along the border with Israel, particularly in the south.

These evolving state structures and ideologies strongly shape how each country handles the armistice lines, refugee camps, and cross border incidents. Domestic politics within Arab states cannot be separated from their policies toward Israel and the Palestinian question.

Israel’s Nation Building and Demographic Changes

Within Israel, the years after 1949 are a period of intensive state building, economic hardship, and rapid demographic expansion. The new state absorbs large numbers of Jewish immigrants from Europe, many of them Holocaust survivors, and from Middle Eastern and North African countries. These populations often arrive with few resources and face housing shortages, rationing, and significant cultural adjustment. The government establishes new towns and rural settlements, some close to borders, partly to house immigrants and partly for strategic reasons.

The demographic make up of Israel changes fundamentally. In addition to Jewish immigration, there remains a minority of Palestinian Arabs who were not displaced during the 1948 war and who become citizens of Israel. Their lives in this period are shaped by a complex mix of formal citizenship, restricted movement, and ongoing military governance in many Arab populated areas inside Israel. Internal political debates address questions of identity, integration of diverse Jewish communities, and the place of the Arab minority in a state that defines itself as Jewish.

Economic development, land use, and resource allocation all intersect with these demographic and political questions. Decisions on where to invest, which regions to develop, and which communities to prioritize are influenced by security concerns and by differing visions of what the state should be. Over time, the structures built in this period, from roads and agricultural systems to educational institutions, will shape how the conflict evolves within and around Israel’s recognized boundaries.

The Suez Crisis and Regional Realignments

A central episode of this era is the Suez Crisis of 1956, which brings regional tensions into direct confrontation with global powers. In July 1956, Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal, previously controlled by British and French interests. Britain and France, unwilling to accept this move, see an opportunity to weaken Nasser. Israel, for its part, is concerned about Egyptian sponsored raids across the armistice lines, about restrictions on its shipping routes, and about Egypt’s growing military power.

In a secret plan, Israel, Britain, and France coordinate a military operation. Israel invades Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, and Britain and France then intervene militarily, claiming to separate the two sides and protect the canal. Militarily, Israel advances quickly and gains control of much of Sinai. Politically, however, the operation encounters strong opposition from both the United States and the Soviet Union. Under intense international pressure, Britain and France withdraw and Israel is eventually compelled to pull back from Sinai as well.

The Suez Crisis has lasting consequences. Nasser emerges in much of the Arab world as a symbol of resistance to former colonial powers, even though Egypt has suffered military setbacks. Britain and France see their influence in the region diminished, while the United States and the Soviet Union become the main external powers shaping Middle Eastern affairs. For Israel, the crisis confirms both its military capability and its dependence on broader international support and constraints. The episode also contributes to further militarization of the conflict environment, including increased arms flows and new defense arrangements.

Persistent Border Tensions and Limited Wars

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the armistice lines are sites of regular friction. Cross border raids, patrol clashes, and artillery exchanges occur along Israel’s borders with Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. These incidents are not full scale wars, but they keep the region in a state of chronic low intensity conflict. Palestinian fedayeen, often based in Gaza or supported by Egyptian or other Arab actors, carry out infiltrations and attacks on Israeli territory. Israel responds with military reprisals designed to deter further incursions and to signal resolve.

The pattern becomes cyclical. One side launches an attack, the other retaliates more forcefully, and then international actors, particularly the United Nations, step in to ease tensions. The UN deploys observer missions and, after the Suez Crisis, a United Nations Emergency Force in parts of Sinai to supervise the ceasefire. Yet these mechanisms cannot resolve the underlying political disputes, and border incidents continue.

On the Syrian front, disagreements over demilitarized zones and control of water resources contribute to regular clashes. Both sides view water as essential to development and security. Efforts by Israel to divert or utilize water sources are often met by Syrian opposition and sometimes by military force. Each episode deepens mistrust and reinforces the sense that the armistice lines are unstable and contested, not accepted borders.

Palestinian Refugees and Political Marginalization

For Palestinian refugees, the years from 1949 to 1967 are shaped by displacement, uncertainty, and limited political agency. Many live in camps administered by a UN relief agency specifically created for them. Host countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria adopt differing policies toward Palestinian refugees, which in turn affect daily life conditions, employment opportunities, and legal status. In general, refugees have little say in regional diplomacy, even though their fate is central to the conflict.

Arab governments speak on behalf of the Palestinian cause in international forums and in domestic politics, but this representation is mediated through state interests and broader regional rivalries. Discussions about possible solutions, including repatriation, resettlement, or compensation, do not lead to concrete agreements during this period. The refugees remain in limbo, and the idea that their displacement might be temporary begins to give way, for many, to the painful recognition that it may become long term or multi generational.

At the same time, early forms of independent Palestinian political organization start to appear, although they remain less prominent than state led narratives from Arab capitals. Reflections on identity, memory of the lost homeland, and the meaning of return circulate in refugee communities and in the diaspora, laying groundwork for later developments in the Palestinian national movement.

The Rise of Arab Nationalism and Pan Arab Projects

Arab nationalism reaches a high point in these decades. The idea that Arabs form a single nation divided by artificial borders created by colonial powers gains strong appeal. Israel is often portrayed by Arab nationalists as a product of the same colonial system and as a central obstacle to Arab unity and independence. Leaders like Nasser articulate a vision in which the liberation of Palestine and the defeat or rollback of Israel are tied to broader efforts to end foreign domination in the region.

One expression of this trend is the short lived political union between Egypt and Syria, known as the United Arab Republic, formed in 1958. Although the union dissolves in 1961, it reflects the strength of pan Arab sentiment and the desire, at least in some circles, to dissolve state borders in favor of a unified Arab entity. The Palestinian issue is often integrated into this framework rather than treated as a separate national question.

These ideological currents influence policies toward Israel and shape public expectations. Many in the Arab world come to anticipate that Arab unity and collective strength will eventually reverse the outcome of 1948. This expectation increases pressure on governments to take a hard line in rhetoric and policy, while also creating a gap between popular hopes and actual military and diplomatic capabilities.

Relative Calm and Growing Tensions in the Early 1960s

The early 1960s combine moments of relative quiet with underlying escalation. From time to time, the region experiences brief periods in which major confrontations are absent and there is limited international attention. Yet security doctrines on all sides evolve in preparation for possible larger conflicts. Israel invests in building a more advanced military and deepens certain international partnerships, while Arab states acquire more modern weapons from external allies, particularly the Soviet bloc.

Domestically, societies in the region undergo social and economic changes. In Israel, economic growth and institutional consolidation progress, but social inequalities and tensions between different Jewish communities, and between Jewish and Arab citizens, persist. In Arab states, land reforms, nationalization policies, and political repression reshape social structures and opposition movements. In many places, political life is highly constrained, so the cause of Palestine and the struggle against Israel serve as one of the few arenas where governments can channel popular discontent outward.

Despite the lack of a large scale war until 1967, the sense of a temporary and uncertain calm is widespread. Military exercises, intelligence assessments, and public rhetoric increasingly anticipate the possibility of a decisive confrontation at some point in the future.

The Road Toward the 1967 War

By the mid 1960s, several developments converge to create a more volatile environment. Regional alliances shift, and competition among Arab states for leadership of the Arab world intensifies. Different regimes seek to demonstrate their commitment to the Palestinian cause and their willingness to confront Israel. Cross border incidents continue, including escalating clashes on the Syrian front, and disputes over the use and diversion of water resources feed distrust.

At the same time, limited Palestinian guerrilla activity, supported to varying degrees by Arab states, begins to increase. This activity is modest compared to later decades, but it contributes to a sense in Israel that threats are multiplying on several fronts. Israeli leaders debate how to respond to provocations without triggering a broader war, while also believing that deterrence requires forceful responses.

Internationally, the Cold War context further complicates crisis management. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are more deeply involved in the region than they were immediately after 1948, supplying arms and political backing. Each fears that local conflicts might spiral into superpower confrontation, but each also uses the Arab Israeli tensions to expand influence.

By 1967, mistrust, unresolved refugee claims, competing national projects, and regional rivalries have produced a situation in which relatively small incidents can have large consequences. The armistice framework that began in 1949 is strained to the breaking point. The coming Six Day War will fundamentally alter the map, transform the nature of the conflict, and mark the end of this particular chapter in the history of the region.