The Palestinian Refugee Situation

Displacement at the End of the 1948 War

After the 1947–1949 war, several hundred thousand Palestinians who had fled or been expelled from their towns and villages did not return. By 1949, they were scattered across neighboring Arab countries and in the parts of Palestine that had not come under Israeli control, primarily the West Bank, then annexed by Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, administered by Egypt.

The armistice agreements signed in 1949 recognized ceasefire lines, not final borders, and did not resolve the question of these displaced people. For Israel, large scale return was seen as a security threat and a reversal of the demographic and territorial outcome of the war. For the refugees and surrounding Arab states, the right to return home, or receive fair compensation, quickly became a central political and moral demand.

Over time, the United Nations and other bodies settled on a working definition of a Palestinian refugee that was narrower than the total number of people who had ever lived in Mandatory Palestine. To receive assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, or UNRWA, a Palestinian refugee was defined as someone whose normal place of residence had been Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948 and who had lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the conflict. Their descendants, in turn, became part of the refugee population, which means that the number of people defined as Palestinian refugees increased from several hundred thousand in 1948 to several million by the mid 1960s.

Host Countries and Patterns of Dispersal

By the early 1950s, Palestinian refugees were primarily located in five main areas. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, then under Jordanian rule, many refugees settled in camps near existing cities such as Nablus, Hebron, and Jerusalem, while others lived among the local population. Jordan granted citizenship to most Palestinians within its territory, including many refugees, which gave them legal rights that refugees elsewhere did not enjoy, even though their social and economic situation often remained precarious.

In the Gaza Strip, Egyptian authorities did not annex the territory but maintained military administration. The narrow coastal strip saw one of the highest concentrations of refugees. Many had come from nearby villages and towns in what had become southern Israel. Since Egypt did not permit large scale movement out of Gaza, refugees were largely confined to a small, densely populated territory with few economic opportunities, a pattern that shaped later developments.

In Lebanon, refugees were treated as temporary guests and were not granted citizenship. They were housed in camps on the outskirts of major cities such as Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre, as well as in the north and the Beqaa Valley. The Lebanese political system was sensitive to demographic balance between religious communities, and incorporation of a large, mostly Sunni Muslim refugee population was seen as destabilizing. This contributed to restrictions on Palestinian rights to work, own property, and move freely, which deepened their marginalization.

In Syria, refugees were given more extensive civil rights than in Lebanon, including the right to work and access to public services, though not citizenship. Like in other host countries, they lived both in camps and in urban neighborhoods. Smaller numbers of refugees also migrated further afield, including to Egypt, Iraq, and later to the Gulf states, but the core of the refugee population in this period remained in the immediate region.

The pattern that emerged between 1949 and 1967 was therefore one of fragmentation. Refugees in different host countries experienced different legal statuses, rights, and restrictions. Yet they still saw themselves as part of a single national community with a shared claim to Palestine and a common memory of displacement.

Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Conditions

From the late 1940s onward, tented encampments and makeshift shelters were set up to house the displaced population. Over time, many of these evolved into more permanent refugee camps. Despite the word “camp,” these were not short term facilities. By the 1950s, tents began to be replaced by concrete or cinder block structures, although ownership of the land often remained with host governments or private landlords, not with the refugees themselves.

Living conditions in these camps during the 1950s and early 1960s were generally harsh. Overcrowding was common, sanitation systems were weak or absent, and access to clean water and electricity was limited. Health problems such as infectious diseases spread more easily in such conditions. Nutrition improved as relief systems became more organized, but malnutrition, particularly among children, remained a concern in some areas.

At the same time, the camps developed their own forms of social organization. Families from the same towns or villages often settled together, reproducing pre-1948 social networks. Local committees, religious institutions, and later political factions played a role in distributing aid, organizing education, and mediating disputes. The camp environment came to embody both hardship and a powerful sense of shared identity rooted in the lost villages and neighborhoods of pre-war Palestine.

The Role of UNRWA and International Aid

In 1949, the United Nations created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA, specifically to address the needs of Palestinian refugees. This was separate from the broader UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which dealt with other refugee populations. UNRWA’s mandate focused on humanitarian relief and on “works” projects that were initially meant to promote economic self-reliance and, in some plans, resettlement.

During the 1950s, UNRWA provided basic services such as food rations, primary healthcare, and primary education. It built and operated schools, clinics, and other infrastructure in camps and some non-camp areas. The agency’s work was funded by voluntary contributions from UN member states, which made its budget vulnerable to political and economic fluctuations.

“Works” schemes, which were designed to provide employment and sometimes had the implicit goal of integrating refugees into host economies, met strong resistance from many Palestinians. Many refugees viewed them as a step toward permanent resettlement and an abandonment of the right to return to their homes. As a result, large scale development schemes largely stalled, and UNRWA’s role gradually narrowed to one of ongoing relief and service provision.

This created a paradox. On one side, the continued presence of a dedicated international agency signaled that the refugee issue remained unresolved. On the other side, reliance on UNRWA for schooling, healthcare, and food rations made daily life in the camps dependent on an international bureaucracy whose mandate did not extend to political solutions.

Legal Status and Citizenship Questions

Between 1949 and 1967, the legal situation of Palestinian refugees varied sharply by country. Jordan’s decision to grant citizenship to most Palestinians in the West Bank and to many refugees within its territory gave them rights such as voting, access to public employment, and state services. However, their connection to the land from which they had fled remained unresolved, and a large portion continued to live in camps with a distinct refugee status, sometimes with special identity documents marking them as such.

In contrast, Lebanon maintained a policy of non-naturalization. Refugees there held special identity papers issued by Lebanese authorities or UNRWA but not regular citizenship documents. This left them in a legal limbo. While they could reside in the country, they lacked full political rights and were often restricted in certain professions. Over time, regulations in Lebanon would limit access to many skilled jobs to citizens only, further constraining refugees’ economic prospects.

Syria’s approach fell between these two examples. Palestinians were treated as residents with many similar civil rights to citizens, including work and access to education, but they remained legally distinct and did not receive Syrian nationality on a large scale. This preserved the claim to a separate Palestinian identity but also left their long term status uncertain.

These differing legal frameworks had lasting consequences. They shaped where Palestinians could settle, what kinds of livelihoods they could pursue, and how they imagined their future. Across all host countries, even where civil rights were comparatively broad, most refugees continued to see their situation as temporary and tied their long term aspirations to return or to some form of collective political solution.

Economic Life and Social Change

Economically, Palestinian refugees after 1949 faced severe obstacles. Many had lost land, homes, tools, and savings as a result of the war. In rural areas especially, land had been the main source of income. In host countries, they often lacked access to land and were forced to seek wage labor in urban settings, construction, agriculture for others, or petty trade.

Over the 1950s and early 1960s, some refugees managed to improve their situation. In Jordan, those with citizenship could work in government jobs, schools, and the army. In Syria, Palestinians increasingly took up skilled and semi skilled professions, such as teaching, small business, and public sector employment. In Lebanon, despite restrictions, some refugees found work in sectors that relied on cheap labor, such as agriculture, construction, and informal commerce.

Education became one of the most significant avenues of social change. UNRWA schools, sometimes supplemented by host country systems, offered basic education to large numbers of children who might otherwise have remained illiterate. Over time, a growing cohort of educated Palestinian youth emerged from the camps and towns. These young people often sought opportunities abroad, particularly in the Gulf states, where oil driven economic growth created demand for teachers, engineers, and other professionals.

This gradual rise in educational attainment helped create a Palestinian middle class in exile, although this class remained vulnerable to political changes in host countries. At the same time, large numbers of refugees remained poor, especially in Gaza and in the more restrictive environments of some Lebanese camps. The combination of rising expectations, limited opportunities, and unresolved political status contributed to a sense of frustration that would later fuel organized political activity.

Memory, Identity, and Camp Culture

During this period, Palestinian refugees developed and preserved a strong collective memory of their pre-1948 lives. Families kept keys, property deeds, and other documents that symbolized their claim to homes left behind. Stories about particular villages, their landscapes, wells, mosques, churches, and markets were passed down to children who had never seen them. Over time, a repertoire of songs, poems, and narratives about lost places, often described as “the homeland,” grew in importance.

In the camps, this culture of memory coexisted with new social realities. The spatial layout of camps sometimes reflected the origin villages of residents, so that particular alleys or clusters of houses were associated with specific places in historic Palestine. Weddings, funerals, and religious rituals became occasions to express both local traditions and a broader Palestinian identity.

This identity was not only about loss. By the 1960s, Palestinians in exile had begun to see themselves as a distinct national community, linked not just by common origin but also by their shared fate as refugees. Cultural production, including literature and political writings, increasingly referred to the “Palestinian people” in national terms. The refugee experience, especially the memory of 1948, became central to how this peoplehood was understood.

The camps in particular came to symbolize steadfastness and resistance. They were often portrayed as spaces where the will to return was preserved and where new generations would grow up with a heightened sense of political purpose. This symbolic dimension did not erase the hardships of daily life, but it gave many refugees a framework for understanding their situation as part of a larger historical struggle.

Political Dimensions and the Right of Return

From 1949 to 1967, the Palestinian refugee question was a core political issue in regional and international forums. Arab states regularly raised it in the United Nations, insisting on implementation of resolutions that they interpreted as affirming a right of return and compensation. The most often cited was UN General Assembly Resolution 194, adopted in 1948, which stated that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return or whose property had been damaged. The legal meaning and practical applicability of this resolution became a central point of dispute.

For Israel, large scale return of refugees was seen as incompatible with maintaining a Jewish majority and with the outcomes of the 1948 war. Israeli authorities argued that the refugee problem was a result of a war initiated by Arab states, that many refugees had left voluntarily or at the urging of Arab leaders, and that, in any case, resettlement in Arab countries or compensation schemes should be considered instead of return. Arab governments and Palestinian representatives rejected this view and emphasized accounts of expulsion, fear, and inability to return due to Israeli laws and policies.

Within the refugee communities, the right of return was not only a legal or diplomatic concept. It became a central part of collective identity, frequently invoked in political slogans, literature, and everyday conversation. For many refugees, any political solution that did not include a recognized right to return to original homes and lands, or at least some form of meaningful restitution, was seen as unacceptable.

By the early 1960s, a growing number of Palestinians felt that Arab states had failed to advance their cause effectively. This contributed to the emergence of independent Palestinian political organizations that placed the refugee experience and the right of return at the heart of their programs. While the formation and strategies of these organizations belong to another chapter, it is important to note that they drew heavily on the networks, memories, and frustrations that had developed in the refugee camps and communities during this period.

Cross-Border Infiltration and Security Tensions

The unresolved refugee situation also had a direct impact on the borders between Israel and neighboring territories. During the 1950s, some Palestinians attempted to cross back into what had become Israel, for reasons ranging from retrieving property and crops to visiting relatives or engaging in armed attacks. Israel referred to such persons as “infiltrators.” Israeli forces responded with patrols, fences, and at times retaliatory raids into neighboring territories, including areas where refugees lived.

Not all crossings were violent. Many were motivated by economic necessity or personal reasons. Nonetheless, Israel largely treated cross-border movement as a security threat. Arab states, in turn, sometimes tolerated or supported militant groups operating from their territory, while at other times they tried to curb uncontrolled crossings to avoid escalation. Refugee communities found themselves caught between their own desire to access former lands and the strategic calculations of states.

These incidents deepened the association, in Israeli public opinion, between the refugee population and security threats, which further hardened resistance to any large scale return. For refugees, the closing of borders and use of force against those who tried to cross reinforced the perception that they had been permanently barred from their homes, except through force or major political change. This mutual distrust contributed to cycles of retaliation and shaped how both sides viewed each other in the years leading up to 1967.

The Situation on the Eve of 1967

By the time of the 1967 war, the Palestinian refugee problem had shifted from a short term humanitarian crisis to a long standing, unresolved political and social reality. Many refugees had lived almost two decades in camps or in exile communities, and a new generation had been born that knew the homeland only through stories and symbols. UNRWA continued to provide essential services, but its presence also highlighted that no comprehensive political settlement had been reached.

In Jordan and Syria, significant numbers of Palestinians had begun to organize politically, often outside direct state control, and refugee camps had become important centers of mobilization. In Lebanon and Gaza, harsh conditions and restricted opportunities heightened feelings of marginalization and anger. Across all host countries, the question of how to reconcile daily life in exile with the aspiration of return remained unresolved.

The 1949–1967 period thus left a double legacy. On one side, it entrenched a dispersed, often vulnerable refugee population whose lives were shaped by legal precarity, economic hardship, and reliance on international aid. On the other side, it fostered a powerful sense of shared identity and a deeply rooted claim that the displacement of 1948 was not an ending but an injustice that still demanded redress. This legacy would profoundly influence the regional conflict and the internal dynamics of Palestinian politics in the years that followed.