Table of Contents
Setting the Postwar Borders
After the 1948–1949 war, armistice agreements fixed new lines between Israel and its neighbors. These were not recognized as final political borders, but in practice they shaped daily life and security calculations. The so called Green Line separated Israel from the West Bank, which came under Jordanian control, and the Gaza Strip, which came under Egyptian control. Separate armistice lines divided Israel from Syria along the Golan Heights and from Lebanon in the north.
From the outset, these lines were fragile. None of the main Arab states recognized Israel, and Israel did not recognize any territorial gains by neighboring Arab states beyond what had been agreed in the armistice. The lack of a formal peace meant that even in periods without large battles, the situation often resembled a low intensity war focused along the borders.
Infiltration, Refugees, and the "Fedayeen" Phenomenon
One of the earliest and most persistent sources of tension involved Palestinians trying to cross back into what had become Israel. Many had fled or been expelled during the 1948 war and now lived as refugees, some only a few kilometers away from their former homes. At night, individuals and small groups crossed the armistice lines to retrieve possessions, harvest crops left behind, or visit family. Others engaged in smuggling or petty theft.
Israeli leaders defined almost all cross border movement without permission as a security threat. The Israeli army and border police carried out patrols, laid mines, and sometimes adopted a policy of shooting infiltrators. Over time, these confrontations grew more organized and violent. Egyptian and later other Arab intelligence services supported or tolerated armed Palestinian groups that carried out raids into Israel. These fighters became known as fedayeen, a term that suggested self sacrifice and resistance.
The fedayeen attacks varied in scale and motivation. Some were acts of retaliation or revenge by refugees. Others were integrated into broader Arab state strategies, especially from Egyptian controlled Gaza. Israel viewed the raids as proof that neighboring governments either could not control their territory or were actively using irregular warfare as a tool. This perception shaped Israeli doctrine for the next decades.
Israeli Retaliatory Raids and the Logic of Deterrence
Israeli leaders developed a strategy of large, often highly publicized retaliatory raids against villages or military positions in neighboring territories that were associated with infiltration. The goal was not only to stop specific attackers. It was also meant to deter Arab states and local communities by imposing a heavy cost for any incident.
Some of the most notable early operations targeted villages in the West Bank under Jordanian rule or areas near the Egyptian border. These raids often resulted in significant casualties and property damage. In Israeli discourse they were portrayed as necessary to enforce quiet along the borders and compensate for what Israel saw as ineffective or hostile policing on the Arab side. In Arab and Palestinian narratives, these actions were described as collective punishment and aggression against civilians.
The pattern became cyclical. Infiltration or fedayeen attacks led to Israeli retaliation. Retaliation sometimes caused deaths among civilians or soldiers on the Arab side, which in turn fueled more anger and support for cross border operations. International observers, including United Nations truce supervisors, frequently condemned both the raids and the inability of the parties to deescalate. However, the UN had limited tools, and its resolutions rarely altered the basic dynamic.
The Jordanian Front and the West Bank
The longest and most sensitive frontier from 1949 to 1967 ran between Israel and the West Bank under Jordanian rule. Many of the villages along this line were inhabited by Palestinians who had family, property, or memories just across the Green Line. The proximity made infiltration easier and also made any clash potentially explosive.
Jordan, particularly after its formal annexation of the West Bank, had an interest in appearing as the responsible sovereign power. It tried, with mixed success, to control its side of the border and restrict fedayeen operations. At the same time, King Hussein faced domestic and regional pressure not to appear weak toward Israel or disloyal to the Palestinian cause.
This tension produced a complex situation. On the ground, there were constant small incidents: farmers crossing to fields now inside Israel, shepherds whose flocks wandered over the line, local revenge attacks, or shootings between patrols. At the political level, Jordan complained to the UN about disproportionate Israeli reprisals, while Israel insisted that Jordan bore responsibility for any attack originating from its direction. The fragility of this front was underscored by high profile raids and counter raids that periodically dominated regional news and increased mistrust.
The Egyptian Front, Gaza, and the Road to Suez
Along the frontier with Egypt, the focal point was the Gaza Strip. Gaza was heavily populated with Palestinian refugees and had few economic opportunities. This environment contributed to frustration and support for armed actions against Israel. Egyptian military intelligence worked through Palestinian fedayeen networks to carry out operations across the border, especially in the early and mid 1950s.
Israel viewed the fedayeen attacks from Gaza as part of a broader Egyptian policy under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who presented himself as a leader of Arab nationalism and a challenger to Western aligned powers. Israeli planners believed that Egypt used the fedayeen to harass Israel while building up its own army and forging ties with the Soviet bloc.
The spiral of actions and reactions on this border helped lay the ground for the 1956 Suez Crisis. Prior Israeli raids into Egyptian territory, Egyptian sponsorship of cross border attacks, and Nasser’s moves on issues like the Suez Canal created a climate in which Israel, Britain, and France coordinated a military operation against Egypt. After the war, under international pressure, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula but tensions along the Gaza and Sinai front continued, even if for a time there was a reduction in cross border attacks due to international oversight, including a UN force in Sinai.
The Syrian Front and the Demilitarized Zones
To the north, the armistice line between Israel and Syria included several demilitarized zones, areas where neither side was supposed to station military forces. These zones were agriculturally valuable and also strategically sensitive, because they lay between the Golan Heights and Israeli communities in the Hula and Jordan Valleys.
Conflicts here often revolved around land use, water, and the interpretation of the armistice agreements. Israeli farmers tried to cultivate disputed fields or drain swamps, while Syrian forces sometimes fired on them or objected through UN channels. Israel accused Syria of shelling civilian areas and of harboring or supporting infiltrators. Syria, for its part, claimed that Israel was encroaching on Arab land and changing the status of the demilitarized areas.
These disputes were sometimes local and tactical, such as clashes over tractors entering contested land, and sometimes more strategic, involving artillery duels and air force engagements. Over time, the Syrian front became deeply entangled with wider issues, most notably disputes over control and use of water from the Jordan River and its tributaries.
Water Projects and the "Water War"
Water was a crucial resource in the region, especially for Israel’s plans to support immigration and agricultural expansion, and for neighboring states’ own development projects. Disputes about water management intensified in the early 1960s, when Israel began large scale projects to divert water from the Jordan River system to the arid south of the country.
Arab states saw these projects as a threat to their own water security and as a unilateral step that ignored regional interests. In response, they discussed and partially implemented counter projects, including attempts to divert headwaters of the Jordan River inside Syria and Lebanon, so that less water would flow into Israel.
Israeli leaders declared such diversion efforts unacceptable. The dispute quickly turned into a series of military incidents. Israeli forces attacked construction sites and equipment in Syrian controlled areas. Syria responded with artillery fire and support for Palestinian guerrilla operations. These clashes over what was essentially water infrastructure deepened the cycle of provocation and retaliation and added another layer of strategic hostility along the northern border.
The Rise of Cross Border Guerrilla Warfare
By the mid 1960s, the nature of cross border conflict began to change. Rather than relying mainly on Arab state controlled fedayeen units, new Palestinian organizations began to operate with their own identities and agendas. These groups saw cross border attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets as a primary method of struggle.
Some of these organizations carried out operations from Syrian, Jordanian, or Lebanese territory. Although the details belong in later chapters, the key point for this period is that border tensions increasingly involved not just state militaries but also non state actors with their own leadership and strategies. This blurred the lines of responsibility. Israel accused neighboring governments of complicity or negligence when attacks were launched from their soil, while those governments sometimes claimed they lacked full control over the groups.
The emergence of these guerrilla movements increased the frequency of low level clashes and made political management of border incidents more difficult. Each attack and reprisal influenced public opinion on all sides, contributed to an atmosphere of siege and resistance, and made compromise appear riskier.
Escalation toward Wider Confrontation
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, border incidents had created a pattern of chronic instability. Even in years without a full scale war, the frontiers were active zones of tension, with shootings, shelling, infiltrations, and large reprisal operations. International attempts to restrain the parties, including the presence of UN observers and peacekeeping forces in some sectors, reduced some risks but never fully stabilized the situation.
Inside Israel, border violence reinforced feelings of vulnerability and justified large military investments and a doctrine that favored rapid, forceful responses. Among Arab governments and Palestinian communities, repeated Israeli incursions and civilian casualties fueled narratives of aggression and occupation that supported harder line positions.
This period set important precedents. The idea that borders were not stable, that force could change facts on the ground, and that the absence of a political settlement meant that arms remained central to security and national aspirations became deeply entrenched. The accumulation of grievances, military preparations, and mutual suspicion along these borders contributed directly to the regional climate that made a wider war possible in 1967.